


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1 June 1982

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2554

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BIR ZAYT VICE PRESIDENT INTERVIEWED ON WEST BANK SITUATION

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 12, 19 Apr 82

[Interview with Muhammad Hallaj by Alistair Lyon: "Life on the West Bank"; date and place not specified]

[12 Apr 82 pp 8-12]

[Text]

The last few weeks have ushered in a new and more violent phase in the confrontation between Israel and the Arab population living in territories occupied in 1967. The ferment was touched off by Israel's peremptory dismissal of three West Bank mayors and the entire town council of El-Bireh for refusing to cooperate with Governor Menahem Milson and other officials in the civil administration which Israel introduced last year. Eight people have lost their lives and dozens more have been injured in street clashes between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers and settlers. The Druze population of the Golan has been on strike for two months in protest against Israel's annexation of the area and its attempt to impose Israeli citizenship on the inhabitants.

In an effort to gain insight into the background to these events, *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO's* Alistair Lyon turned to Professor Muhammad Hallaj, Vice President for Academic Affairs at Bir Zeit University and Chairman of the Council for Higher Education in the West Bank. We are publishing the interview in full as a two-part special survey. In the first part, Prof Hallaj outlines the context of the renewed violence in the occupied territories. He assesses Israeli policy and speculates on how it is likely to develop in the future. He describes how the Palestinians might react to a possible future annexation of the West Bank and Gaza and comments on the extent of PLO support in those territories. Finally, Prof Hallaj gives a graphic illustration of the reasons for his personal attachment to the West Bank.

Q: Some people, particularly in the West, have been

surprised at the intensity of the violence and protests which have taken place in the occupied territories in recent weeks. Could you explain why we are seeing this now, after nearly 15 years of occupation?

A: Well, I wouldn't want to give the impression that it's the first time this has happened since the occupation started 15 years ago. A similar level of intensity and comprehensiveness of resistance to the occupation happened in 1976. It had pretty much the same reasons. It happened at a time when the Israelis were trying to impose what they call civil administration on the West Bank, in addition to other issues like the continued confiscation of land, violation of traditional Arab rights in some of the holy places, Jewish prayers in Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, the municipal elections, which all converged to produce a flare-up. And most of these reasons have helped ignite the flare-up this time also. The municipal question, the civil administration, the land confiscations — it's a repeat in a way.

This time the intensity and the duration have probably been greater than at any previous time, although as I said what happened in 1976 approximated what happened last month. This time, these perceived threats to the Arab community in occupied Palestine happened within a new context. I think this is probably why people got stirred up more than ever before. The reasons are really the same. There is something new in the context, which is basically the Camp David agreements, and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, so people put the provocations, the attempts to impose the civil administration by force, for example, within this larger political context. They see them as a serious attempt this time to put an end to any possibility

of Palestinian independence, to cut down the possibility of Palestinian aspirations.

That is why the occupation authorities' actions with regard to the municipalities are viewed more seriously than similar attempts in the past, because once they are put within this larger political context they gain new significance. I think this is why the reaction of the Palestinians has been more intense than in the past.

Q: The 1976 elections were perhaps an attempt on the Israelis' part to find a supposedly moderate Palestinian leadership with which they could deal. Do you think recent events indicate that that attempt has failed? If so, what do you think the next Israeli move is likely to be?

A: There is no question that the Israeli attempt to find a substitute for the Palestinian national leadership has failed. They realised this early on. We were supposed to have municipal elections in the spring of 1980 and I followed the Israeli press very closely at the time. There was a large debate in Israel. Should we or should we not permit the election to be held on time? We had the previous elections in the spring of 1976 and we were supposed to have other elections four years later. They were very frank in their discussion, especially in the Hebrew press in Israel. And the conclusion reached at the end of this debate was that if we do hold the elections, in the expression that was used frequently in the Israeli press, "the PLO will occupy the municipalities from the inside." So they were certain, in their own minds at least, after they thought very intensely about the whole issue, that there was no chance that another form of leadership that is more amenable to the Israeli occupation would emerge.

That was why they decided not to hold the elections and they extended the tenure of the municipal councils indefinitely. This time, and they said it clearly, Menachem Milson made a statement which was published in the press a few days ago saying that municipal elections would be held but only after the support for the PLO has been broken in the occupied territories. They have clearly and explicitly admitted that they cannot afford to have free expression of opinion in the occupied territories unless they are willing to accept the PLO as the spokesman of the people in the occupied territories. Since they are not ready to concede or accept this fact, they want to change the situation before they permit the expression of opinion.

Changing the situation means doing whatever needs to be done to eradicate or suppress any kind of sentiment that exists in the West Bank that is in favour of the PLO. I think this is what the campaign is all about. They said very clearly that this is a decisive conflict between us and the PLO. When we win this conflict then we'll think about having things like municipal elections. So they are stacking

the cards in a way. They want to stack the cards and then play.

Q: But if they can't find any amenable Palestinians, as you call them, does that make the Israelis more or less likely to move towards outright annexation of the West Bank and Gaza?

A: I don't know. It would have been easier to guess about the future if the Labour Party were in power. They are more rational. The people who run Israel now have an element of irrationality in their thinking and it makes them a little more unpredictable. But I personally suspect that they would try to avoid as much as possible an actual explicit, legal annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. It doesn't really give them anything they don't have now. They run the place as if they had sovereignty over it in every way. They are continuing to take over the natural resources of the territory, land and water. They control the labour force, the markets. They lack nothing of the prerogatives of sovereignty over the territory. Not annexing the territory legally leaves them with an option they need to have to face world public opinion. If they actually annex the territories they gain nothing in terms of control and ability to use and manipulate the resources and so on. On the other hand, they would be making it clear to the whole world that the Palestinian question is a closed question to them. They are trying not to give that impression. It is a clear violation even of the Camp David agreements, which stipulate that after a period the final fate of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip come up for negotiation. If they annex these territories, they are foreclosing the option of even negotiating over their fate.

Q: But you wouldn't rule out an impulsive move to annex the remaining occupied territories?

A: No, I wouldn't rule it out, because the present Israeli régime has unleashed forces in Israel — I would say in a way it's similar to what happened in the US when Reagan came to power. It's not just that the decision-makers have certain orientations and ideological perceptions or commitments, but they have encouraged an attitude within their publics that would make it possible for an impulsive move to take place. Especially the degree of emotion that has been unleashed through the withdrawal from Sinai.

The Israeli public has talked itself into believing, and its government has talked it into believing, that Israel has sacrificed too much for the sake of peace with Egypt, that they are uprooting people who have been settled for four, five years in a place — it's a trauma, or this is how it has been pictured to the Israeli public, that it's a traumatic experience for them. Maybe to placate this kind of opinion,

an impulsive action is likely. I wouldn't rule it out. This is why I was saying that if they were taking decisions on a rational basis, they wouldn't annex the West Bank and Gaza. Another reason why it would not be in their rational interests is they would lose any possibility that some Arab régimes, like the Jordanian régime, would continue to cooperate in undermining the PLO. As long as it (the occupied territories) is not annexed, the Jordanian régime will continue to think that the possibility still exists to go back to the *status quo ante*. But once annexation takes place, they might in effect be putting the Jordanian régime in a corner where they would have no choice but to work with the Arabs rather than with somebody else.

Q: If annexation were to take place, do you think the Palestinians might react by taking Israeli citizenship and using their voting power to elect their own representatives to the Knesset and change Israeli policy from within?

A: I think that if Israel were to annex the West Bank and Gaza, there is no possibility that anybody would take up Israeli citizenship in the foreseeable future. Now, if Israel can make its annexation stick for a very long period of time, with Arab and international reaction being limited to protests, condemnations through resolutions at the UN and this sort of thing, and if the Arabs do not begin to shape up so that they will be able within the next five years to take it back then it will begin to look to people as if this is a very very long-term proposition. Then maybe 20 years from now, when they give up on the possibility of being liberated, they might begin to think of another approach to tackle the question. Take citizenship, elect people to the Knesset, make demands that we are no different than Zimbabwe was. This more especially in view of the population growth. Between now and the year 2,000 we'll probably be back to the way we were during the mandate — two-thirds and one-third. But we would be in the majority and they would be in the minority — so you have an explicitly and obviously European settler régime with a white minority governing a native majority. Then I think in a situation like this what you are talking about might happen. But I don't think there is the slightest chance that this would happen as an immediate response: all right, they annexed us, let's become citizens and work through the system. I don't think there is any chance that this will happen in the foreseeable future. What will happen in the foreseeable future is that annexation would intensify efforts on the part of people in the occupied territories to resist assimilation and hold on to their distinctiveness and personality and structures and their capabilities in the hope of keeping their community intact until the day comes.

Q: But isn't it true that the thrust of Israeli policy is to integrate the West Bank and Gaza into the rest of the country in such a way as to make any future separation impossible?

A: It will never be impossible to separate again. This is something I think the Israelis are counting on. They say *de facto* annexation will scramble the eggs so that no one can unscramble them in the future. I think they are making a big mistake. I think what they are doing through *de facto* annexation and scrambling the eggs in terms of demography, economics and infrastructure and the rest of it will have a very different result than the one they hope for or anticipate. Scrambling the eggs, they hope, will rule out the possibility of separation in the sense of the emergence of some kind of independent Palestinian state.

Q: Can you give some examples of what you mean by scrambling the eggs?

A: Through land confiscation and settlement. For example, they are trying to break down the geographic continuity and the demographic homogeneity of the West Bank, so that no one who looks at it would say this is an Arab place — it will become an Arab-Jewish place on the ground. So that Arabs cannot say this is our place, because people will come along and see otherwise. In addition to land confiscation and settlement to mix the population so that it will no longer be an Arab territory, they are subordinating the infrastructure to Israeli infrastructure. They are building roads from east to west instead of the customary north to south. The West Bank, geographically and demographically, lines up on a north-south axis. This is the way the roads are, this is the way the towns are spread out, this is the way the lines of communication are. They are now building what they call trans-Samaritan highways, a series of roads connecting the Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley with the coastal region to switch the operation from east to west instead of from north to south so that the axis will be linking the Jewish presence in the Jordan Valley and the coast. This will be the prevailing pattern of interaction.

They are subordinating the water systems by connecting towns and villages to the Israeli water network, so that if you want to drink you have to deal with Israeli structures. The same thing is done with the electricity grid, to the degree that they are obstructing imports of generating equipment to electrify villages or replace obsolete equipment, though this equipment does not cost them anything since it is the Arabs who are paying and they are not asking the Israelis for assistance. They do this to force the villages to hook up to the Israeli grid.

Even the health system is being hooked up to the Israeli structure. They closed the central laboratory in the West Bank where the hospitals used to run their tests. The hospitals have their own equipment, but it is limited and many tests had to be sent to the central laboratory. The Israelis closed that, so now they have to send the samples to Hadassah Hospital. The Medical Association in the West Bank told me that 40 per cent of the budgets of the West Bank hospitals goes to Israeli hospitals to pay

for these tests. This gives you an idea of the volume of services that is being geared to Israeli hospitals because they have no other way to do it.

Scrambling the eggs is not just through the settlements, putting Israeli Jews in Arab territories, but linking its economy and infrastructure, roads, telephones. You can't call Nablus from Ramallah without the call being routed through Natanya first. So in every way they are integrating the daily life of the West Bank, in addition to mixing its population, with Israeli institutions and services to make it impossible to separate them.

But what I was saying was that the Israelis hope by doing this to foreclose the option of a separate Palestinian existence by a policy of *de facto* integration. I think what will happen instead, if they actually succeed in doing this, is that they will simply make it impossible to separate peacefully. This is what they are accomplishing. They are making violent separation the only way out. They are not ruling out separation, but they are ruling out peaceful separation. *De facto* annexation therefore has very serious implications, not just for us and the Israelis but for the region as a whole, and possibly beyond that. But unfortunately, not many people seem to understand that.

They think that if Israel manages to complete its *de facto* annexation, then it will get what it wants, namely to rule out the possibility of the emergence of a Palestinian state. I don't think they are ruling that out. I don't think they can ever rule that out. What they are ruling out is the possibility of it happening by peaceful means.

Q: So-called moderate mayors such as Elias Freij of Bethlehem and Rashid Shawa of Gaza have said it's time for the Palestinians to concede Israel's existence and get down to negotiations while there is still something to negotiate...

A: I would not agree that Freij and Shawa represent moderate opinion if by moderate opinion we mean mainstream, middle-of-the-line opinion, which is the way I understand it. A moderate opinion is something not on either the extreme left or right, but represents usually the bulk of the opinion of a community. Now in that sense they are definitely not representative of moderate Palestinian opinion. They are more correctly described as deviationists and the best proof of this is that Shawa and Freij deviated from an obvious consensus in the occupied territories and in Palestine as a whole by meeting Milson and the officials of the so-called civil administration.

They are usually described in Israel and the Western press as moderates, but they are not really. They are deviationists. They are people who have taken themselves outside the consensus. Verbally, they commit themselves to the Palestinian consensus. Every day they reaffirm it. But it is verbal only and on the level of actual behaviour,

they have been deviationists. So they can't really be taken to be moderate in the sense of representing a large sector of opinion. They don't. It is perhaps too much to say nobody, but only a very insignificant sector of West Bank opinion would view these two people as representing any significant opinion in the occupied territories. So when they say before we lose everything, before time runs out, let's do this or that they're really not representing anybody. There is no tangible body of opinion to back them up.

Most Palestinians get the feeling that somebody is trying to panic us, stampede us into accepting something that we really cannot afford to accept simply because it does not meet our minimal needs and expectations as a people. It is used as a tactic, but we can't be stampeded into accepting something just because of the fear that we might wake up one day and find that we have even less next week. So what? This is a very long-range struggle and this tactic has been used against us since the Balfour Declaration days.

You might say, it has proven to be correct. No it hasn't. It has proven to be correct the past 50 or 60 years, but this is a people's struggle not that of an individual. These 50 or 60 years don't mean anything to us. We are descendants of the Canaanites, so this is a very brief period. History cannot always be determined within such a brief period of time. The price is too much. If we say let's hold on to what we can get now, what is it? We're not being offered anything. It's a meaningless argument really. Who's offering a state that we are turning down? We are not being stubborn in the sense that we are being made an offer and we want something more — we are not being offered anything.

Q: Would you put Freij and Shawa in the same category as the Village Leagues?

A: Yes, in one sense they are in the same category in that they are being groomed to take positions that would deviate from the Palestinian consensus. There are differences of course. The Village Leagues are more explicitly Quislings, selected, financed and protected by the Israelis. It's a more obvious thing. At least in the case of Elias Freij, he was elected by the people of Bethlehem.

Q: How would you rate support for the PLO in the occupied territories?

A: There has never been a plebiscite to give you figures or percentages, by I think that the time is past for wondering whether or not the PLO is decisively supported in the occupied territories. This is a question that should have been raised in 1968 or 1969. Anybody who raises this question today is someone who really doesn't want to concede the point, not someone who doesn't see it. There

have been innumerable occasions to give very strong indications — no free elections, no plebiscite — the situation doesn't permit them, but in so many other ways.

The Western countries used to talk in the 1950s about people voting with their feet. Leaving East Germany and going to West Germany, for example. You have the same kind of situation manifesting itself daily on the West Bank. People are voting with their feet, with their fists, with the slogans on the walls, with the signs they carry on demonstrations, petitions, with letters they send to consuls in East Jerusalem, to the UN, to visiting delegations on various occasions, whenever a provocation takes place — when King Hussein came up with his United Arab Kingdom project in 1972, when Sadat went to Jerusalem, when the civil administration was put forward.

Whenever one of these occasions comes up and they feel the need to express their aspirations and their feelings, they have made it very clear, very often in written documents, signed by a lot of people representing various organisations, institutions and bodies in the West Bank, that the people do not accept any representative other than the PLO both inside and outside the occupied territories. This is something that can be observed daily. I can't tell you 80 per cent or 90 per cent, but there is no question that it is overwhelming support. And by the way, this is not strange or unexpected. It would be strange and unexpected if it were otherwise, for the simple reason that the Palestinian people want to assert their identity and personality and to achieve independent status and self-government. Self-government not in the prostituted Begin sense, but in the usual, traditional way we understand it — to govern oneself. And the only party which can be trusted to work diligently and sincerely for this, and not just to give lip service to it, is a Palestinian party.

So there is nothing which should surprise people or require evidence that someone who speaks my feelings should be regarded as representing me. A representative means two things, as Edmund Burke said when he ran for Parliament: a representative can be someone chosen by a group of people to speak on their behalf. He is a mouthpiece. The PLO is not representative in that sense because we have never been given a chance to pick someone to be our mouthpiece. But on the other hand, another

meaning for representative is someone who speaks my feelings, and who represents me and in that sense there is no question that the PLO represents overwhelmingly Palestinian opinion in the occupied territories.

Q: Talking of people voting with their feet, do you see a serious threat of depopulation in the West Bank, of people, especially the better-educated, leaving to start a new life elsewhere?

A: Not really. Not voluntarily. Of course there has been, always was, always will be — the West Bank is a small place with very limited capabilities, especially for educated and skilled people, because there is no economic development. But I don't foresee an exodus, unless they are forced to leave. For many reasons. The West Bank is a nice place to live and it's really the one place where you feel at home. It's the one place in the world where nobody asks you where are you from, what are you doing here. Speaking from personal experience, when I first went to the West Bank, I was sitting in someone's office and this old man walked in — really I'll never forget this experience no matter how long I live. I never saw the man before. He'd never seen me. Nobody introduced us. The minute he walked in, he said: "Aren't you Youssef Hallaj's son?" He took one look at my face and he knew who I was. I belonged — he knew my father.

It's a nice place, a nice moderate climate and lots of other reasons. Besides, we experienced other places and life is rough in many ways. So I don't foresee a large-scale emigration unless people are forced into it, for example if the occupation continues and economic development continues to be non-existent, if opportunities to work in Israel are closed — this is another possibility — if methods are stopped of supporting people in the occupied territories from outside to help them survive, then yes, it can happen. The alternative would be starvation. But it would be a false situation. I don't think any other situation would produce an exodus. Some Israelis have suggested, and have written in their newspapers, that they should take advantage of the opportunities that the next war would provide to get rid of a few hundred thousand people from the West Bank and Gaza. This is another possibility. But other than that, I don't think it's conceivable.

[Text]

In last week's issue we carried the first part of an interview with Professor Mohammed Hallaj, Bir Zeit University's Vice President for Academic Affairs and Director of the Council for Higher Education in the West Bank. In the second part of the interview, Prof Hallaj analyses the ways in which the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza have responded to the occupation of their land by Israel and weighs up possible solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He describes how higher education, his own special interest, has fared under Israeli rule. Finally, Prof Hallaj outlines the reasons for his optimism about the long-term future of the Palestinian cause. The interview follows:

Q: Apart from demonstrations and protests such as the recent ones, how else have the people of the occupied territories reacted during the years of the occupation?

A: I suppose we can single out two methods of reacting to the occupation in the sense of reacting to it by trying to withstand it and cancel its intended objectives. One is a heightened awareness of the importance of solidifying and giving greater viability to the community that is living under occupation, to help it survive the occupation and maintain its personality and distinctiveness and future capabilities – and this has become a very conscious thing. In other words, it has not simply been a consequence of the invisible hand as Adam Smith put it, or everybody seeking his own personal advantage that led eventually to creating something social. There is a conscious understanding of the need to enhance the viability of the community as a community, to make it an embryonic nation. This has been one of the important responses of the community under occupation and to the threat of the occupation to their survival. The other response has been to cling more tenaciously and obstinately to the idea of a Palestinian national liberation movement and of the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people and as the embodiment of Palestinian nationhood. They feel it symbolises Palestinian nationhood and the right to independence for the Palestinian people. I think these have been the two self-defence mechanisms by which the Palestinian community under occupation tries (to react). The other things are really sporadic. They tend to deal with occasional provocations like the intensification of settlement or land confiscation, or deporting a group of people or blowing up homes. The demonstrations of this kind of resistance to the occupation have been in response to this kind of provocation. But the others that I mentioned, enhancing the viability of the community in a conscious and purposeful way and sticking with the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, have been the responses of the community to the overall purposes of

the occupation and the way we perceive the purpose of the occupation which, to use the Arabic expression, consists of *taghyib al-shaab al-falastini* – to make us absent, to make us not exist. These have been the two major ways to face that threat. The demonstrations are methods for coping with specific acts of repression – closing a university, deporting a mayor, blowing up a mayor, building settlements next to a town, etc.

This is why I think it's wrong (and I'm saying it because I often hear it, even from Palestinians) to evaluate the importance of demonstrations on the ground in terms of whether or not they have accomplished something like forcing Israeli withdrawal. Some people, unfortunately even among Palestinians, feel that if these activities do not end up by forcing Israel to withdraw, if they don't persist and continue to escalate until the Israelis decide to give up the West Bank, then these activities have failed.

I think this is wrong. This activity is not designed to produce that effect. What is designed to produce the failure of Israel to really swallow the West Bank permanently are the other ways that I mentioned – sticking to the land and trying to create a social presence not just an individual presence in the occupied territories, to hold on to a society and increase its capabilities for survival.

State probably couldn't absorb diaspora

Q: In the event of a Palestinian state being set up in the West Bank and Gaza, could it absorb the Palestinian diaspora, in particular the several hundred thousand Palestinians living in Lebanon?

A: I don't think so. I just don't see how a state in 20 per cent of Palestine, and the poorer part in terms of arable land and water resources, can absorb them. It depends what you mean by *diaspora*. If you are talking about four million Palestinians, I don't think it's conceivable. Whole studies have been done on the economic viability of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and even the more optimistic of them, like the one entitled *The Economic Case for Palestine*, foresee the possibility of maybe 2 to 2.5 million people, taking into consideration the resources of the territory and so forth. So a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would alleviate the hardships the Palestinians are living under and would alleviate the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is why I think it's something worth looking into.

But if we think of it as a final ultimate solution that would resolve all the issues emanating from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine question, it doesn't. You

will continue to have a *diaspora*, not to speak of other things. There was a time when the world community considered the Palestine problem as a refugee problem. In the late '60s and early '70s a change of thinking took place when everybody said it's a political question. But we forgot that it's really both. What was wrong with the previous analysis is not that it's not true — it is a refugee problem. It's a question of homelessness for a lot of people.

The error in the previous analysis is that it ignored the other aspect of this matter, that it is a national question, a political question. When we discovered the political aspect, we made the mistake of forgetting about the other part of it. It's really both.

A state on the West Bank and Gaza may do some thing about the second part of the issue. Politically we'd be recognised as having a political personality. We'd have a man in the UN (a fully-fledged member). We'd have a flag and our ambassadors would be able to fly the flag on the front of their limousines — and we'd feel happy like other people, emotionally. We'd have passports. Palestinians would be able to travel. They'd have the protection of their embassies abroad. It does have a lot of advantages. It gives us the assurance that finally the world sees us as equal to other people.

But I think it would not be able to handle the other aspect unless it were accompanied by a repatriation agreement. If a Palestinian state were to be set up in the West Bank and Gaza and part of the package were to be the repatriation of refugees, the implementation of UN resolutions on the subject, then conceivably you would have handled both sides of the question. But what worries me about people who talk about a state in the West Bank and Gaza is first that they assume that the West Bank and Gaza are really distinct territories, rather than a historical accident of cease-fire lines. They also ignore the issue of *diaspora* that you mentioned. So if you want to resolve the issues rather than simply do something that's better than nothing — it has to be one of two things.

I'm leaving aside for now the original Palestinian proposition of a democratic, secular, non-sectarian state. Nobody seems to want to talk about that. I'm not sure why myself. I don't know of anybody who really thought hard about it and then reached the conclusion that it's not good. It was rejected the minute it was heard. Leaving that aside, if you want to think in terms of resolving the conflict on the basis of partition — the two-state solution — I think to have any significant effect in resolving the issues, it would have to take one of two forms. One is a state in the West Bank and Gaza if this is really what the world community insists on and nothing else. But it has to be accompanied by the repatriation of refugees. Otherwise you only solve half the problem. Or, if Israel wants

to maintain its demographic purity as a Jewish state, a modified version of the 1947 partition plan. Because in order to solve the *diaspora* problem, this Palestinian state must have land and resources for resettlement. If the '47 plan is not good because it has chopped up the place into six or seven pieces like a chessboard, let's make it more rational. But the division must be fair. Not 80 to 20 per cent, because otherwise you haven't solved much of the problem.

Q: As Director of the Council for Higher Éducation in the West Bank, you have been intimately concerned with the fate of higher education under Israeli rule. Could you describe how higher education has been affected by the years of occupation?

A: Until 1980, higher education was able to achieve a great deal in the West Bank and Gaza. It could have achieved more in a freer situation, because the occupation did create many difficulties which made it harder to produce a better and more effective system of higher education in the occupied territories.

To give you some examples of the sort of restraints and restrictions and obstructions caused by the occupation, there are restrictions on the entry of people into the occupied territories. There aren't enough people who have residence in the occupied territories, people who have West Bank identity cards, to man the administration or faculties of the institutions. So we had to have people come from outside to work as faculty members, Palestinians and non-Palestinians. We've had Canadians, French, British, Americans, a Dutchman, a Chinese. They are a minority of the faculty, but we often needed to bring people from outside.

And there are Palestinians who have no residence in the West Bank like myself. I happened to be abroad when the occupation took place so I lost my residence. These people can come with the permission of the military government and can work if they are given work permits. Now there are many people — and I know because I was involved in the recruitment process — many Palestinians working abroad in the University of Jordan or the University of Riyadh or in the US, who wanted to come and teach in the one of the institutions in the West Bank. But they are professional people. They have tenure. They have careers. They are well-established in the institutions where they work. They are willing to come, but not on such an uncertain basis as that which the occupation forces on us. We tell them we can request a visitor's permit for you for 30 days. Hopefully, the military governor will extend it. And very often people will say: 'well I'm sorry, but I have wife and children to feed and I can't do it that way. If you can assure me that I can continue to live there and work I'll come.' We have no way of

assuring them. The military governor makes the decision.

So we lost a lot of people because of this. Work permits often are not issued. We request a work permit. Very often they don't deny it but they don't approve it either. So the practical effect is that it's refused.

Censorship: we have not been able to import a single Arabic journal for our libraries. We selected a list of journals that the Hebrew University receives regularly. We told them we don't want anything that the Hebrew University does not get and we submitted a list of 60 journals. These are scientific and academic journals published by Arab universities and other research institutions. They refused to permit one, even one of them, to be imported. This not only diminishes the quality of education that takes place, but it also discourages faculty members from coming.

People tell us very often: 'I don't want to come to Bir Zeit and commit professional suicide. I have to read and do research and write and if you can't get any journals, well, I'm sorry.'

Financially, the occupation has had disastrous implications because education institutions were tax exempt before 1967. After the occupation, we lost this status. In Israel, taxes are extremely high. I'm talking about tariffs when we import equipment for offices or laboratories or building supplies or whatever – and there are not many of these sort of supplies available locally. We have to import them. Very often, when you buy something you end up paying twice or more than twice the actual cost by the time you get it. So it's really been a financial drain on these institutions, this loss of tax exemption status.

Other problems include restrictions on travel. Very often a faculty member is invited to give a paper at a conference. He goes through the trouble of doing his research and writing his paper and then when he gets to the (Allenby) bridge (to cross with Jordan), his paper is taken from him and he is turned back. It has happened many times. Anything you want to publish is subject to censorship, even the student magazine that is intended for internal circulation just for the student body has to go to the censor for approval.

There are restraints on cultural activities in general. For example, the list of forbidden books in the occupied territories. The military governor issued a list which now has more than 3,000 books on it that are forbidden to be sold or possessed or placed in libraries in the West Bank. These make up an important part of Arab cultural heritage. We're not talking just about political books that are offensive to Israel. Many of them predate the state of Israel and have nothing to do with Israel of Zionism. They are really a part of Arab history and cultural contribution.

This kind of atmosphere in itself stifles the possibility of developing the quality of education. Education needs

freedom. In a military occupation, we suffer as a consequence.

In 1980, the military governor went beyond the traditional forms of harassment and restraints which we could live with. We paid the price for them in many ways, but we managed to survive. In the summer of 1980, the military governor issued Order No. 854, which they called an amendment to the Jordanian Education Law of 1964. The Jordanian Education Law applies to pre-university education and to two-year institutions beyond secondary schools, like teacher training colleges. Jordan has a special law. The University of Jordan has its own law. It's not subject to the Ministry of Education. It's not ruled by the education law which governs the other schools.

The Israelis used this as a pretext to say that there is no law to govern the universities in the West Bank, so we have extended the 1964 law to make it cover institutions of higher education. In fact, what this did was to put the university on the same level as a secondary school. They wanted the universities run and operated in the same way as secondary schools are. This means that the education officer who belongs to the military government has to approve the curriculum. If you want to add a new programme, for example, to teach a new field, they have to approve employment of faculty members, administrators and employees, just the way they do with secondary schools which are completely under the control of the military government.

Even students from outside the West Bank, from Galilee or even the Gaza Strip, have to have a permit from the military governor to register for university in the West Bank. So what they were trying to do was to remove whatever degree of autonomy and self-government that the universities had and place them completely and directly under the control of the military government.

When this order was passed in the summer of 1980, they did not try to implement it immediately. We objected to it. All the universities did, along with their boards of trustees, arguing that they can no longer be universities in the true sense of the word if this were really applied, if every time you want to appoint a faculty member you have to see if the military governor approves or not.

Part of this decree by the way, is that anybody who has been held – not convicted – for security reasons and has been interrogated, cannot be employed by a university. Most people in the occupied territories have been held for questioning at one time or other so this disqualifies most people from working in the universities.

So initially they passed this decree but they did not really make an effort to implement it. We thought that maybe they did it just to establish the idea that they are boss. We protested on principle that they really had no right to do this. It's a violation of international law, not

just academic freedom in the institutions. They are creating law, amending Jordanian law, that we are supposed to be governed under. But as long as they were not enforcing it, there was no need to go beyond going on record that you oppose it for various reasons.

Recently, however, with the inauguration of the civil administration under Menahem Milson, they are obviously trying to put this into effect. So they appointed someone to be in charge of higher education and this is in effect what brought about the closure of Bir Zeit University for the second time this year.

This man showed up with another man, apparently his guard, on campus and said: 'I'm your boss. I've come here to see what you're doing.' In effect that's what he did. He just showed up on campus as someone who is in charge of higher education, an indication that they are now seriously trying to implement this. If they do, I think the universities and higher education in the West Bank will be just a name rather than a reality. A university cannot be a university with a military officer in charge of it.

Q: Do you feel at all optimistic about the future?

A: It depends on whether you are talking about the near future or the distant future. About the near future I'm very pessimistic. The balance of power in the region is so out of kilter against us. I tend to think of politics as pretty much like physics. It is the way things are. It's a question of forces and vectors and the forces and vectors are against us at this stage. Israel has aspirations. They see no reason why they should deviate from them because of the balance of power. So in the short run I am very pessimistic about the possibilities.

In the long run, I am very optimistic. In fact, more than optimistic. I'm certain in my mind that in the future things will be quite different, partly because what happened is so unnatural that it cannot possibly endure as a permanent situation. There is no way that it can. Not only this of course. It's not just a question of philosophical faith, although that is a part of it. I think injustices tend to be rectified generally and eventually, especially when they represent such a fantastic aberration from the ethics, the norms that the whole human race subscribes to.

In the 1920s and '30s, we were denied self-government, but so what? Most of the human race was denied self-government. But now we stick out like a sore thumb. We are practically the only ones left. For that reason, some rectification is bound to take place. But the second reason, which is probably more important in the practical concrete sense, is that justice failed in this case. I think this is because we have not utilised even a small fraction of our capabilities to set it right. This cannot possibly go on indefinitely. It's impossible. This is because more and more people in the Arab world are being hurt by it.

More and more people are being drawn into the struggle and if they are not actually drawn into it, they are becoming victims. More and more people are becoming victims. More and more people are feeling the injustice and sharing in the injustice so that eventually this is going to produce a greater degree of mobilisation of resources to do something about the injustice. This is why I think it's bound to happen. There is no question in my mind and so I'm even more than just optimistic on this point.

Q: When you say "our" capabilities, you mean Arab rather than just Palestinian?

A: Yes, both.

Q: But you don't see any hope for the moment of effective action on the part of the present Arab régimes?

A: No, not for the moment. There are reasons for this.

The Arab governments which exist now fear doing what needs to be done in order to change the situation. I think this is one reason why many of them have been so antagonistic to the Palestinian resistance. The concept of a popular opinion or people being involved in their destiny is not acceptable. Because there are not popular régimes.

The Palestinian revolution has introduced two related concepts which are perceived to be very dangerous concepts to most Arab governments. One of them is the right of a people to have something to say about what sort of a future their country should be seeking to bring about. The other concept, which is related to it, but is probably even more dangerous, is the concept of an armed people: the idea that we not only have a right to say something about our future, but to do something about it. It's very dangerous.

Recently I heard a statement that I still find difficult to believe. I keep thinking I didn't hear it correctly. One Arab leader, there is no need to mention names, said what is happening in the West Bank is very dangerous, has dangerous implications. And he didn't mean dangerous to Israel. He meant dangerous to the Arab régimes. And he made it clear. I'm not just guessing what he meant. He said what's happening in the occupied territories, this uprising, has dangerous implications because the Arab people are being emotionally charged as a consequence. When an Arab who lives in Amman, or Riyadh or Algiers or wherever, when he hears that his government is getting AWACS and F-16s and Phantom's and I don't know what else such as missiles, and he hears that three young men in Jenin attack an Israeli patrol with knives, there is no way that this does not have an impact on him.

That is what this fellow was talking about. Obviously what he was saying is, "let's do something to calm down this situation on the West Bank because it's contagious. Our people are being emotionally charged as a result." This is what I'm talking about. We have the capabilities

to prevent the injustice that is being inflicted on us and the threats that we are facing. I am convinced that the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the Israeli problem, ought to be a simple problem for the Arabs. But we need to do certain things that the present Arab régimes are afraid to do. The consequences are dangerous to them. Basically, what I am referring to is the proper mobilisation of resources, including human resources. Putting the right man in the right place, for example. Even something as simple as that. Many of them feel that this is a dangerous thing to do. You put the reliable man in the right place. Not the right man, the capable, the qualified man. So we're making it impossible for us to use our own resources to serve our cause.

This cannot possibly endure. It cannot continue for ever. This is why in terms of the long-term future I'm personally more than optimistic. It's bound to happen. There is no way that it can be prevented from happening in the future, but now the situation is rather different.

Q: A lot of people would argue that the last bout of Israeli repression could not have been undertaken by the Israelis if it were not for the degree of disunity that currently exists in the Arab world.

A: Yes, it's not just disunity by the way. I happen to believe that it's incorrect what almost everybody else is saying, particularly abroad, that once Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel there is no way the Arabs can undertake a conflict with Israel. This is nonsense. Why shouldn't the Arabs be able to carry on a conflict with Israel without Egypt? Why shouldn't Syria and Jordan, not to speak of the others, stand up to Israel? So it's not just a question of disunity. Even within each régime, they are handicapping themselves, they handcuff themselves in terms of their ability, because to enhance their capabilities they need to do certain things that they are afraid to do for their own internal purposes to release the potential that is inside.

I'm not talking about unity here, or even about coordination. It's not really the basic problem. I think unity

is important, but it's not really the only thing. In each one of the Arab countries, they are suppressing their own potential. They are unable to use their own potential, because utilising their potential requires a kind of behaviour that is incompatible with the interests of the régime in power. Letting people free to exchange ideas for example is something as simple as that. People solve their problems because they are able to talk them over with each other. They exchange ideas and learn from each other. We are unable to generate ideas because we are unable to discuss them freely. It's something as simple as that.

Within this kind of system there is no way that people can enhance their capabilities and mobilise their resources. As long as that situation persists there is not that much you can do even with unity.

Like Krishna Menon said 30 years ago when they asked him about the Afro-Asian bloc when they started talking about it. He said when you add zero and zero and zero you come up with zero, maybe even a bigger zero. So it's not just a question of unity. Unity within the existing system doesn't mean anything, because unity in itself does not generate capabilities.

Q: So you are saying the Arab régimes must democratise themselves.

A: Yes. I see no other way of the Arab people being able to enhance their effectiveness. I disagree with the view that many people have expressed over the ages that democracies are weak. I don't believe that. The experience of Germany and Britain in the 1930s and '40s demonstrated this. I think dictatorships and authoritarian régimes can do miracles over the short run. Hitler baffled everyone with what he was able to do for a number of years. But they have a fatal weakness. They can't survive for a long time. And a people's accomplishment is cumulative. No matter what you can achieve in three years, it doesn't mean anything in a historical sense. But it's a cumulative process that creates civilisation. So, yes, I do believe that democratising the Arab régimes is a prerequisite. It is an essential for doing anything, not just to face the Israeli challenge but to face the challenges of development.

PRESSURE ON WEST BANK UNIVERSITIES SCORED

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English No 1346, 3-9 May 82 pp 36-42

[Article by Ghassan Beshara: "Crash Course: How To Kill a University"]

[Text] The West Bank's Bir Zeit University has been reopened after its sixth Israeli-enforced closure.

But the Israeli drive to induce a 'self-inflicted' permanent closure is continuing.

Bir Zeit University on the West Bank is being "strangled to death" by the Israeli occupation authorities, according to Bir Zeit University Professor Salim Tamari.

The university, closed by the Israelis on February 16, was reopened in mid-April when the two-month closure order expired.

"But the problem is going to be how to keep it open," said Prof. Tamari, who was interviewed by *Monday Morning* in Washington recently.

"The Israelis will hesitate to close the university permanently because such an action would carry negative images of Israel, which claims to be a Western-type democratic state," he said. "But the threat of permanent closure is there, in the sense that Israel is imposing so many restrictions on the university that it may sooner or later completely paralyze it. The paralyzing restrictions imposed by the Israelis appear to be aimed at a university closure which would seem to the world to be self-inflicted."

Tamari, 37, born in Jaffa, Palestine and educated at the Bir Zeit University, the University of New Hampshire in the U.S. and Manchester University in England, is now teaching sociology and anthropology at Bir Zeit.

The Israelis have been justifying their crackdown on Bir Zeit University on the grounds that it is a center for anti-Israeli agitation and for the organization of the Palestinian resistance.

"We emphatically deny these charges," Tamari said. "The proof is that when the university was closed, the degree of protest and resistance increased manifold — although the

leaders of our Student Council were under house arrest, scores of other students were detained and the university itself was physically closed."

Bir Zeit University, Tamari added, was no different from other educational institutions on the West Bank: "It is a meeting place for a large number of young people who share the West Bank residents' political sentiments. They express their views, they demonstrate, they reflect the political picture on the West Bank in general. Demonstrations and confrontations with Israeli soldiers are everyday occurrences in every West Bank city, and Bir Zeit is no exception."

FREEDOM TRADITION

There are over a thousand students in Bir Zeit University — around 80 percent of them from the West Bank, 15 percent from Gaza and five percent from Galilee and abroad, Tamari said. What could be seen as setting them apart from most other educational institutions in the occupied territories was Bir Zeit's tradition of secularism, freedom and democratic faculty-student relations "which allows students to express their sentiments without internal hindrances."

The Israelis object to the secularism, freedom and democracy which characterize Bir Zeit University, regarding them as political tools directed against the occupation. There is no doubt that the university fosters and encourages secularism, freedom and democratic leanings among its students, but Tamari said this was more an educational policy than a political one.

The freedom, democracy and secularism prevalent in the university, he said, were the factors that "have made it possible for the university to develop higher educational standards. Our high standards are absolutely contingent on the presence of freedom, democracy and secularism."

Bir Zeit has a school of engineering, a faculty of arts, a faculty of sciences and a school of business and economics. A faculty of fine arts is expected to open in the 1983-84 academic year. None of the faculties offers graduate degrees yet, except the faculty of arts, which offers an M.A. in education. The university is a member of the Union of Arab Universities and the International Union of Universities, has twinning agreements with several Arab universities and cultural exchange agreements with universities in Germany, the Netherlands and England. The progress it has made is considered remarkable in view of the fact that Bir Zeit, established in 1923 as a high school and turned into a junior college in 1951, became a fully fledged university only in 1974.

The Bir Zeit University has encouraged the spirit of freedom, democracy and secularism among its students not only by allowing them to express their views "without internal hindrances" but also by establishing formal links between the university and the people of the West Bank.

It has done so by launching a program of community help

which makes it compulsory for all Bir Zeit students to serve the West Bank community in one way or another.

The program began in the mid-1970's as a voluntary Student Council project: students would go out in the olive harvest season, in September and November, and help farmers pick their olives. The university eventually moved in, organized community-help programs and made it compulsory for every student to put in 120 hours of community help in his four years at the university. The community help includes manual work in road-building, building of additional rooms for existing schools, harvest work, etc.

In addition, the university sponsors a community health program — a clinic which serves 15 villages around Bir Zeit and has a research unit attached to it — and runs a "Village Data Bank" which monitors conditions in the occupied territories.

EXTREME PRESSURE

The Israeli authorities have reacted to the university's freedom-of-expression tradition and its insistence on involving itself with the West Bank community by exerting extreme pressure on the Bir Zeit institution in several ways, including the following, Tamari said:

Students: Daily harassment of students has become a way of life. Students the Israelis do not like are routinely stopped at checkpoints, insulted and often prevented from entering the university. Elected student leaders have been placed under "town arrest." Scores of other students have been detained without trial and without charges. Students who have a record of detention are barred from the university, "and it is a fact that one-third of the West Bank's entire school-age population have a detention record."

Faculty: Bir Zeit has a ratio of one teacher to every 11 students. Around 25 percent of the faculty come from outside the West Bank; around half of these are Palestinians with U.S., Canadian and European nationalities and the other half are North Americans, Europeans (especially British and Irish), Greeks, Cypriots, Turks, and one Chinese.

Israeli pressure on Bir Zeit faculty members takes the form of various restrictions on work permits for applicants from abroad and constant observation of all faculty members without exception. Faculty members who express their views publicly, especially in press interviews, are called in for interrogation, and some of them have had their work permits withdrawn because "the Israelis felt they were 'sticking their noses in affairs that are none of their business.'" Israeli-Arab faculty members are frequently barred from the West Bank. Other local faculty members have been placed under "administrative detention" — in one case for four years — or ordered out of the West Bank.

Israeli harassment has also extended to members of the university's board of trustees, some of whom have been deported.

Literature and equipment: Over a thousand Arabic books have been banned in the West Bank, although they are readily available in Israeli universities. The Bir Zeit administration protests vigorously about this "black list" but is more concerned about other Israeli measures to prevent any Arab books and periodicals from reaching the university. Crates of valuable books and periodicals donated to Bir Zeit by various Arab countries have been turned back by the occupation authorities. Applications for permission to import Arabic books and periodicals which are not on the black list have been rejected — "not formally but by delaying tactics. Applications have been piling up with the Israeli authorities who for several years have been saying they are 'studying' them."

"In effect," Tamari said, "Bir Zeit University is being cut off from the scholarly and literary currents of the Arab world."

In addition, the Israelis are levying very high taxes on the educational equipment needed by the university, making it almost impossible to obtain much of this equipment.

Tamari noted that this latest closure of Bir Zeit University was the sixth since Israel took over the West Bank, and the repeated closures were having an additional paralyzing effect on the university, playing havoc with full academic years.

The February-April closure, he said, was prompted by the refusal of the Bir Zeit University, along with the West Bank's two other universities, to cooperate with the occupation authorities in the application of a military law (No. 854) issued in 1980 which subjects all universities in the occupied territories to the same stringent regulations which are applied to high schools.

Among other things, the law subjects university curricula to strict regulations, calls for "security clearance" for all students and faculty members and makes it mandatory for all universities to apply for a license every year — on the understanding that the license would be granted or withheld according to the behavior of the university during that year.

"We have refused to cooperate with the occupation administration on Military Law 854, and that is precisely why the university was closed in February," Tamari said.

"It is very important for public opinion around the world to realize that what has happened since February is not merely a two-month closure but part of an organized plan to strangle the entire future of higher education in the occupied territories."

EDUCATIONAL STRANGULATION

Israel's continuing attempts to "strangle" Palestinian education in general were recently discussed in depth by Prof. Hanna Nasir, a former president of Bir Zeit University who was deported by the Israeli authorities in the mid-1970's.

Nasir, in a written study on the subject made available to *Monday Morning*, states:

In a broad sense, one of the major aims of Israeli policies seems to center on hindering proper education for the Palestinians, suppressing their culture and making them lose contact with and pride in their own heritage. In contrast, the Israelis seem to be providing their own people with every opportunity for education in an attempt to revitalize a long dead heritage.

Another equally important aim seems to be in the direction of inducing and coercing Palestinians to accept the image of the Arabs as backward, dependent and passive and the Israelis as possessing political, military and, in a fundamental manner, cultural superiority.

One aspect that simplifies the implementation of this policy is the fact that most Israelis share the view that their various government bodies seek to impress upon the Palestinians. However, one must distinguish various levels of operation of these policies, ranging from the direct consequences of the Israeli presence among Palestinians, to the exploitation of that situation and finally to carefully thought-out policy programs. In practice, it is quite difficult to discern at which level a specific action is operating. Of course, the Israeli educational and cultural policies toward the Palestinians are complementary to their political aims. However, they are intrinsically more difficult to analyze.

One of the first aspects of the education of Arabs in the occupied territories is that the military are in charge of the system. The adverse significance of that is the fact that the military can, and usually does, act arbitrarily under the false pretence of security, without recourse to due process of law and without having to show reasons for their actions. It should further be realized that the military rule now extends officially over what is commonly called the West Bank and Gaza. However, the Arabs of Israel lived under that rule till 1966 and, in spite of the fact that it has been lifted officially, its ill effects still persist.

It might therefore be of value to take a quick glimpse at the education of the Arabs in Israel and note the extent of the damage that has been done. Their degrading level of education could best be analyzed in figures. In Israel only 76 percent of Arab children aged 5-14 (the compulsory age) go to schools; the comparative figure for the Jewish children is 98 percent. The total number of Arab students in schools (elementary and secondary) is 4 percent of the total number of students, whereas the Arabs represent about 12 percent of the population. The situation in the universities is much worse; here only 1.5 percent of the student population are Arabs.

One can presumably examine many reasons for the inadequate education of the Arabs in Israel, but in the final analysis, the responsibility falls primarily on the government and its deliberate neglect of the education of the Arabs.

JORDAN COMPARISON

In East Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied territories the Israeli policy of downgrading the education of the Palestinians is also apparent. But, because there was already a fairly good and well-established educational system before 1967, the effects of the Israeli policies have been felt only recently.

A good yardstick of these effects is the comparison of the rate of growth in the number of students per capita in all schools in these territories with the rate of growth in East Jordan, whose government was in charge of the West Bank until 1967:

For the last three years, the per capita growth rate in East Jordan has been about 50 percent more than in the occupied territories. Another yardstick which indicates Israel's deliberate neglect in the education of the Arabs is that the Israeli military authorities' educational budget per student in the occupied territories is one fourth what it is in East Jordan. One reason for this difference in educational budgets is the lower ratio of students per teacher in East Jordan compared to the West Bank and Gaza. It may be worth noting at this point that the Israelis approve the employment of one fourth or less of the new teachers requested by the Arab district officers. Moreover, in East Jordan there are continuous retraining programs for the teachers, whereas similar programs are rare in the occupied territories. The very few programs that were run after persistent requests by the Arab teachers were carefully scrutinized and tightly controlled by all the military; topics discussed and teachers participating were subject to prior approval. The small educational budget of the military authorities is also reflected in the poor level of school libraries, laboratories and school buildings in general.

Dropping out of schools in the occupied territories has become a serious problem. A lot of students leave their schools for work before finishing even the elementary (compulsory) stage. A recent study showed that the drop-out rate in the West Bank and Gaza is close to 17 percent, compared to eight percent in the East Bank.

Examples of other measures which affect the level of education in the occupied territories and which are a direct consequence of the occupation and its policies are that students and teachers are not allowed on government school grounds after school hours because the military authorities consider that the presence of the students and teachers constitutes a security risk. This restriction has put an end to the extracurricular activities, such as science clubs, that some enterprising teachers had started.

And finally, one should realize that teachers who show initiative in their jobs may be initiating reprisals against

themselves by the military authorities in the form of transfers or demotions or even redundancy. In 1980 alone, about 12 percent of the teachers were affected by these measures on strictly non-academic grounds.

TEXTBOOK CHANGES

The level of education was not the only aspect of education that was affected and downgraded under the Israeli rule; the educational programs themselves were altered and tampered with in order specifically to serve Israel's policies. All the alterations or cancellations were made under the false pretext that Arabic books are full of hatred towards the Jews. It is interesting to note here that in a study made a few years ago by Professor Tamarin* of Tel Aviv University, he was able to show that a great deal of hatred and prejudice is bred in Jewish students through their own school textbooks.

It seems that alterations and deletions in the textbooks in the occupied territories were aimed at:

1. Removing all printed material that had anything to do with discussions of Arab unity and its importance in solving the Palestine problem. Chapters which discussed the effect of economic unity and boycott of Israel were deleted.

2. All printed material that ties Israel to the colonial powers or that ties Zionism to racism was also deleted.

3. Printed material that glorifies nationalism and Arab heroes was removed. Reading material referring to courage and love of one's country and the need to sacrifice for it was deleted. Even casual examples mentioning some heroes are changed. One interesting example is found in an Arabic reading book for the 5th elementary; the question "Where is the tomb of Salah al-Din?" in the original text is changed to "Where is the Mediterranean Sea?"

Right from the beginning of occupation in 1967, UNESCO requested Israel to retain all teaching material and texts in their original form. However, Israel refused that request and ordered all schools, including UNRWA and private schools, to use the new altered texts only.

There was more than just alteration of texts in the educational programs of the occupied territories. Simple vocational centers (six weeks' training or less) were established with probably one motive in mind — to attract students from schools and provide cheap semi-skilled labor for the Israeli factories. In normal times vocational schools could be a major asset in the development of one's country and its economy; unfortunately, the present Israeli centers basically serve the Israeli economy.

JERUSALEM STUDENTS

The situation in Jerusalem is much more serious.

**Georges Tamarin. "The influence of ethnic and religious prejudice on moral judgement." New Outlook.*

Jerusalem was severed from the West Bank and its educational system was linked to the Israeli municipality. Since 1967, an attempt has been made to force all the schools to have an Israeli syllabus. The Israelis carried this policy for a number of years and the students responded by not going to the government-run schools. An alternative had to be found and some private Arab schools were opened in Jerusalem to handle this problem. But because of the magnitude of the problem, these private schools could not meet all the needs. At the same time, under the pressure of parents and students, the Israelis gave in and allowed the previous Jordanian syllabus to be taught in the schools. This only solved the problem partially, however, since up till now students in the elementary cycle are taught the Israeli syllabus. The adverse effects of teaching the youth in a system that definitely alienates them from their culture are quite clear.

But the problems of the Arab students from Jerusalem do not stop at that level. They are not allowed to learn in government-run institutions of higher learning that exist in the West Bank (such as the agriculture institute in Tulkarim or the teacher-training centers in Arroub or Ramallah). Furthermore there are no similar institutions in Jerusalem. Thus the Arab student from Jerusalem has to suffer doubly from his imposed political status and from the education system to which he belongs.

Another aspect of education that Israel is tampering with is higher education. It is important to indicate what the situation was before 1967 and how it developed later.

Before the Israeli military occupation of 1967, most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were able to attain their higher education in Arab or foreign universities. The relatively easy access to institutes of higher learning diminished any motivation (which was always present) for establishing a Palestinian university.

After 1967, the problems of higher education increased significantly: access to universities in the Arab world and abroad became very difficult because the Israelis made it difficult for the students to leave the country and return. Interrogations, accusations and outright harassment were amongst the many obstacles that were raised to hinder students from returning. Thus students who left preferred in general to remain outside and this created a major national issue: the depletion of the country. Moreover, a Palestinian university is important as one of the institutional structures needed in the struggle to achieve a free Palestine. A university with the proper ideas and ideals could be the birthplace of the future leadership of the country.

Implementation of any plans to establish a university is certainly not an easy feat under normal circumstances. It was thus very difficult to consider such plans under the harsh Israeli military rule. However, in 1974, Bir Zeit College — one of the most prestigious institutes in the West Bank at the

time — decided to take the initiative and announced its plans to develop into a full university with special programs to cater for the aims and aspirations of the Palestinians. This initiative was followed later by the establishment of three other universities: Bethlehem University in Bethlehem, Al-Najah University in Nablus and the Islamic University in Gaza. A nucleus of a fifth university in Jerusalem (College of Abu-Dies) was totally crushed by the military authorities almost as soon as it started. This shows the special attention that the Israelis pay to Jerusalem and their insistence on usurping the fundamental and cultural rights of its people.

UNIVERSITY PROBLEMS

At the same time one should realize that the establishment of the other universities did not come about unhindered by the military authorities. They were in fact established despite the presence of the occupation, and the difficulties these universities face now as a result of the military occupation pose a major obstacle to their development.

Some of these difficulties stem from specific regulations imposed by the military authorities — such as the refusal to grant permits to obtain Arabic periodicals from the Arab world, even those that are not political in nature. The academic programs in a university suffer significantly from such regulations which in principle handicap the research that can be done by students or faculty members. Another regulation that is imposed is the levying of customs duties (sometimes more than 100 percent) on imported educational material such as laboratory equipment. This regulation puts a heavy strain on the universities, which have limited financial resources. Besides, it is illegal because it poses a change in the laws prevailing before occupation (not permitted under the Geneva Conventions), which exempt all educational institutions from customs duties.

Another example of hindering regulations is the difficulty in obtaining permits for faculty members from outside the occupied territories to teach at the educational institutions. These permits sometimes take months and in many cases are not granted at all. With the lack of sufficient highly trained scholars in the occupied territories, this regulation poses the greatest single obstacle to the normal development of the universities.

Of course these regulations are not all that hinders education. Continuous harassment that includes storming of campuses, deportation of educators, shooting and killing of students, closing of institutions for lengthy periods and detention of students and faculty members are actions that stifle the educational spirit.

And as if all that were not enough, the Israeli military authorities recently issued specific military orders (No. 854 and others) that pose a further threat to academic freedom. These orders were issued on July 6, 1980 by the military governor of the West Bank and in them he decreed an

amendment to the Jordanian Education Law (No. 16, 1964) that has been in force in the West Bank and an amendment of the Regulation of Teaching License (No. 23, 1965) that is based on the law, as well as two military orders affecting education in the West Bank.

According to the amendment of the law, universities and university-level colleges are to be attached to the education officer in the military command of the West Bank; existing universities are to be considered as having a temporary license only to pursue their operations. The amendment also forces "security" considerations into all educational matters. The education officer becomes, according to the amendment, responsible for granting and renewing licenses of educational institutions, and he is empowered to include "public order" among the considerations on the basis of which he grants such licenses. He is also empowered, according to the amendment, to withdraw or withhold a teaching license from persons who have been convicted under "security" regulations or who have been placed under administrative detention without trial. The two military orders require everyone to obtain written personal permission from a military governor to study or teach in any educational institution in the West Bank.

It should be realized that the amendment of existing laws by military occupation authorities is forbidden by international law, as it contravenes the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Moreover, the actions undertaken by the military governor of the West Bank on July 6, 1980 form the most blatant interference in, and present the greatest danger to, education in the West Bank since the beginning of the Israeli occupation. These actions, if implemented, will lead to the ascendancy of an authoritarian outlook that conflicts with academic principles and that will prevent institutions and individuals from pursuing their legitimate educational activities without interference, hindrance or terrorization.

Because of the gravity of the situation that could result if the orders were implemented, further elaboration and detail on these orders is necessary:

The action undertaken by the military governor of the West Bank falls under four main categories:

1. The amendment of the Jordanian Education Law to include the universities under its responsibilities: The Jordanian Education Law was enacted to regulate education at the level of schools and pre-university institutions. The University of Jordan itself was excluded from the law. Perusal of the law indicated that the aims, activities, regulations and procedures mentioned in the law are restricted completely to the pre-university level. The harm from applying the law to universities comes from two directions:

- Imposing on universities considerations that conflict with the concept of a university and are not in accordance

with its functions, such as the design of curricula, the appointment of professors, the admission of students, the pursuit of research, etc. The imposition of these considerations on universities will turn them into "schools at a higher level" and invalidate their status as universities.

- The violation of the academic and administrative autonomy of universities by attaching them to the education officer in the military command. The autonomy of universities and their protection from bureaucratic restrictions, governmental pressure and military terrorization are well-established traditions with world-wide legitimacy. A university cannot fulfill its mission in a serious and healthy manner if it is attached to an officer within a military command.

2. The intrusion of police and army authorities and "public order" considerations in the licensing of educational institutions: The licensing or accreditation of educational institutions on academic grounds and for reasonable periods of time is done throughout the world. However, the amendment of the education law decreed by the military governor of the West Bank contains two elements that jeopardize the existence of all educational institutions in the West Bank.

- Giving the police commander and the military governor consultative power in matters of licensing of educational establishments and taking "public order" into consideration in these matters. It is clear from previous practices of the authorities that this amendment is nothing more than an attempt to legitimize the assumption of power by the military command over educational institutions and the consolidation of this power.

- Considering existing educational institutions as having only a temporary license. This impedes the planning of these institutions to continue their legitimate activities on a sound basis and places them under the threat of closure by the military authorities.

3. Making military convictions a basis for the prevention of qualified persons from pursuing their teaching careers: It is also a world-wide practice for relevant authorities to grant professional teaching licenses to qualified persons. The bases for such licenses are academic and ethical. However, the amendment of the Regulation of Teaching License by the military governor of the West Bank makes military "security" convictions and administrative detention without trial a basis for withdrawing or withholding teaching licenses from qualified persons. Thus it is possible for the military governor to issue an order of administrative detention against any teacher — and he has the power to do so without showing cause — and then barring him from practicing his profession. It is clear that this poses an immediate and personal danger to all teachers and professors in the West Bank and places them under the threat of military terror that prevents them from fulfilling their responsibilities to the best of their abilities.

4. The requirement of securing a permit from the military governor to study or teach at any educational institution in the West Bank: This is an arbitrary and unparalleled requirement which, if implemented, will place all those who wish to study or teach at the mercy of an absolute military authority that is unrestricted by any principles or conditions. On the basis of former actions of this authority it is obvious that it is perfectly willing to use this power in an arbitrary fashion that will paralyze all educational activities in the West Bank in a short period of time.

It is evident that the actions announced by the military governor of the West Bank on July 6, 1980 pose a direct danger to all educational institutions and all students and academic staff in the West Bank. These actions thus violate a basic right of the Palestinian people under occupation, i.e. their right to learn without fear and hindrance.

That is the atmosphere of education in Jerusalem and the occupied territories. There is continuous harassment, and laws are decreed to legalize this harassment. It is really very difficult for those who have not lived under the Israeli military rule to understand or at least imagine the effect of these actions on students, teachers and all those who are involved in the educational field. It is very difficult to understand the fear of the 10-year-old child when the Israeli troops storm into her school and beat her and her friends. It is also difficult to share the anxiety of the mother who waits for her son to return from school, and then, when he does not, spends days trying to find out into which jail he has been thrown. And finally it might be difficult to understand the pressure on educators who have committed their lives to work for their people in the occupied territories and yet, because of these commitments, they are dragged out in the middle of the night and escorted across the border without even due process of law.

But in spite of all that, one has to look with pride and admiration at all those who share in the educational process in Palestine. They really have done an admirable job. They have faced the challenge with a powerful determination. Yet they should not be left alone. One needs support at the international level from institutions like UNESCO, as well as from individual regional institutions and governments. One needs support from the mass media to expose the Israeli practices without fear or intimidation.

ISRAEL

ARIDOR SEEN BUILDING POWER BASE FOR FUTURE LEADERSHIP

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Mar 82 Weekend Supplement pp 12, 13

[Article by Amnon Danker: "The Man Who Fell From Another Star"]

[Text] At 9:05, Aviva Aridor opens the door and asks for forgiveness. She heard on "Mabat" (TV news program) that her husband, the minister of finance, had criticized the president of Israel, Yitzak Navon, in a government meeting.

Yoram Aridor takes out his pipe and looks at me as someone who says, "I told you so." They did it again. Again incorrect information. Yoram Aridor is not exactly the darling boy of the communications media in Israel. The impression is that both sides suffer from it.

While the minister of finance is busy with consultations and giving instructions to his spokesman to deny the news, I cannot but nurse in my heart a measure of rejoicing at the mishap--he deserves it. I ponder while I look over the pages that I wrote about the conversation we had conducted so far in the office of Yoram Aridor, in the basement of his house in Ramat Efal, near Tel Aviv. All the efforts that I have made to penetrate the wall of silence of Yoram Aridor about Yoram Aridor came to naught. Even from the things that he told me that are not for publication, it is difficult to build an interesting story. Aridor, I believe, is a one-time phenomenon on the Israeli political scene, one that consists of political animals who are willing to whole-heartedly attach themselves to any journalist, under any shady tree, in the style of "I can tell only about myself" with some elaborations.

I look at my papers and see how Aridor evades any personal matter, any story that could have in it something exceptional. Not even to the good, dammit! When I sit to discuss with him something elementary in his vita and I notice all of a sudden that there is no matching in dates, I go back to ask. "Ah," he says, blushing, while puffing his pipe hard, "Yes, I skipped a grade." A cloud passes on his face, he bends forward and says: "Maybe you won't write about it; they will think that I boast about myself." His two spokesmen who sit with us exchange looks and sigh. Their eyes say, it is difficult with him. How typical, I think, that this many, quiet, reserved,

controlled with iron principles with whatever is connected to personal revelations, has two spokesmen, not one; it is clear that they are frustrated.

But this is nothing. We go over a few more years and again the dates do not match, again I inquire and again Yoram Aridor blushes. Of course, again he is uncomfortable. He studied law, political science and economics at the same time. "How did they allow you?" I ask. What do you mean? He tries to evade. I tell him, "I, too, attended the university later but I know that they did not allow everyone to study something else simultaneously with law." "Ah," he says, and now he is very much under pressure. "My law grades were such that they allowed me to take something else."

I will not go over the effort I put into forcefully getting out of him that he finished his studies with honors. When we finish this unpleasant part, the unknown event in the life of the Minister of Finance, his forehead is lined with worry: Maybe they will really think that he brags?

Fear of Failure

The next morning, one of the spokesmen calls me. "Listen," he says, "Yoram almost killed us. He regrets the whole matter. He feels that he revealed himself too much, made a striptease in front of you." I laugh with him. He deserves it, I say to myself. While he dictates to the spokesman the version of the denial, he does not leak, cooperate or participate in the government sport of smearing one's friend behind his back; does he then deserve a good press?

But, on second thought, there is something refreshing, even invoking respect, in this approach. In the whole tumult of leaks--smears--dirt--boastfulness, Yoram Aridor stands tall, cool, puffing his eternal pipe and not playing that game. A man alone.

This man stays alone, in a surprising way, even in a place where to all types of people, it is very difficult to be alone, especially to a minister of finance. In the Knesset restaurant, where it is expected in advance, with a measure of certainty, that the minister of finance will be besieged by politicians who want favors, lobbyists who pull at the sleeves, senior officials, fellow ministers who want to conclude a matter in a hurry or journalists who want information or an evaluation--even here, Yoram Aridor is a man alone. No one goes to him, and he is the first minister of finance in the state of Israel who can finish a bowl of soup quietly. There is something in this cold, introverted, businesslike man that does not encourage ad hoc appeals or gossip, which is typical of the Knesset restaurant, the favor seekers who are rejected in a simple manner, "I don't handle it." He said, "Appeal to the clerk who handles the matter." He put off the journalists with his stubborn refusal to leak. On his first day in the government, two political reporters phoned his home and asked details about the session. He told them what he said. Later no one phoned. Even during the duration of a few hours of conversation in his house, the phone does not ring. It is unbelievable, when it is the minister of finance,

a senior member of the cabinet, the chairman of the party's secretariat. But it is a fact.

Aridor guards his privacy jealously. He asks me not to write about members of his family, not to bring a photographer for the traditional family portrait. In a rare photograph, I see him in one of the evening papers sitting with his wife on the balcony watching a Macabi Ramat-Gan basketball game. "No," he says, "It is not following another basketball fan, Moshe Dayan, and not a desire to gain popularity by means which are--between us--cheap. Simply, the son plays with Macabi Ramat-Gan. That's all.

Yoram Aridor, from a journalistic viewpoint, is a hard nut to crack, but maybe because of that he is fascinating. A man who slowly climbed to a position of central power in the state, and yet so little is known about him. A riddle puffing a pipe and presenting a poker face. A riddle that is a bit frightening. Many people are afraid of Yoram Aridor. People don't like to argue with him. His words sting in a painful way.

A day before our conversation he stood for a long hour on the Knesset podium and tired all the members who attacked him during a discussion about the budget with a long, reasoned rebuttal filled with facts and figures. The Knesset members and the journalists in the balcony asked for mercy but Aridor continued to press them with facts as he saw them.

"I don't know how to grind water," he says to me. "There are speeches in which you have to do it, but I can't. If there is a struggle, I go all the way, using all the relevant arguments at my disposal."

I quote to him an article published in DAVAR in which it was claimed that he used more weapons than was necessary in the debate to destroy his opponents. It is hard for him to understand what I say. "If part of my job is to reply to the opposition, then I want to do it the best. They do not understand what they are talking about, and I want to clarify it for them. I work on it. It was not pulled out of my sleeve."

This is also one of the characteristics of this man: to do whatever he does the best, to excel. Not to fail under any circumstance, even in a small thing.

What pushes him, one who is close to him tells me, is the fear of failure. The wunder kind who had been pushed to the corner for many years wants to prove that his place is in the center, in the middle of decisions and actions. And he has all that is required for that.

In conversations with people who work with Yoram Aridor, one of the most conspicuous things is their esteem and admiration for him. One does not speak here of foolish followers who do not see shortcomings, or young, ministerial assistants who follow their "boss" with a blazer and a James Bond attache case, while their mouths hang open with amazement. Senior people in the treasury, veteran, intelligent officials praise their minister like old-time soccer fans who talk enthusiastically about a newly acquired player.

They admire his sharp intelligence and his ability to quickly absorb and understand new material, his memory, which never fails him, and the clarity of his thinking and expression.

Begin--The Sensitive Point

Aridor is the type of person who is difficult to be at ease with when you sit across from him. You move the toes of your feet in your shoes to remain prepared. It is almost possible to hear his brain waves constantly rattle. He listens tensely, and when he speaks, it is after careful reflection and then his words come out in an aggravating way, organized, and they could be printed as they are.

Many learned about these virtues at the beginning of the Likud government, when as a gift to the Democratic Movement for joining the government, he was given the management of six governmental offices. Somebody told me of a meeting that he conducted at the time, to which he invited the top men of the two offices that were under his supervision. "The people sat and started with idle talk," my source told me. "Aridor sat at the head of the table quietly puffing his pipe. Later they began to talk about the subject for which the meeting was planned but talked off the cuff. Nobody was seriously prepared. Yoram sat listening quietly and puffing his pipe. After 15 minutes, he took the pipe out of his mouth and quietly told them: 'Gentlemen, please go home and prepare your homework. I do not conduct this meeting like that.' They returned after a week and finally everyone knew what they were talking about and conclusions could be reached."

But it did not help him after the portfolios were divided anew. He returned as a deputy minister in the office of the prime minister. His party did not back him to the end when he wanted the position of treasurer of the Jewish Agency. Today there are those who say that it was Akiva Levinsky who brought the Likud victory in the elections. Levinsky, an old-time Labor member from Kibbutz Mayan Zvi, will probably not be happy to hear this thesis, but it has a great deal of truth in it: Levinsky was stubbornly determined to get elected to the position of treasurer of the Jewish Agency. Herut did not demonstrate the same measure of stubbornness in standing behind Aridor who finally became minister of finance and whose contribution to the Likud victory in the elections is not doubted.

Why didn't Herut back him at the time? Here we touch one of the most sensitive points with Yoram Aridor: His relationship with Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Begin does not love him, say party gossips in the party's headquarters. Aridor, who tried to be Begin's good boy all the time; in newspaper archives there are many pictures of him--standing very close to his leader and watching him with large, admiring eyes; Aridor who delivered many voters on a silver platter for Begin because of his correct economic policies, is not treated warmly by Begin as Meridor, for example, is.

The story of Begin-Aridor, so they say, is like the story of a cool father who can not bring himself to love his excelling son. No wonder, say others. Begin respects him but cannot love Aridor, the cool rationalist

who gives a haughty impression, who is carried away sometimes by his flights of imagination. In the Ministry of Finance there is the story of the prime minister who called his minister of finance to transfer a sum of money for a project that Begin was interested in. "No, Mr Prime Minister," was the cool response. Begin, too, will learn, say those who are close to Aridor, that all goes through the budget.

Is it a surprise that this rational, intelligent man with a superior memory finds relief in his spare hours (the few, he says with a sigh) in a chess game? He has two opponents: one, an electronic computer that he learned to beat in every game and the other a neighbor, a government employee (Aridor is willing to admit under pressure) whom he also defeats in most of their games.

But the surprising thing is that Yoram Aridor, because he is so restrained and embarrassed about any self-revelation, is an easy man to like. I know that the description of a soft, sensitive man under a hard and often prickly surface is trite (and therefore suspect for lack of authenticity), but this is probably his true picture. A man who worked with him was surprised as he sat outside his mother's operating room, waiting for the results of the operation, by the appearance of Yoram Aridor late at night with a sandwich bag and a thermos of coffee. Aridor coughed in embarrassment and said: "I thought you might need it." A secretary who worked hard all night typing different versions of his budget speech received at the conclusion of her work at dawn a copy of his speech with a warm dedication and his signature. She burst into tears from excitement. This embarrassed Aridor, who disappeared.

Aridor will hide it with all his ability, but the topic of unemployment bothers him the most of all the areas he deals with. He views unemployment through the eyes of the unemployed individual. The people who work with him say that when there is a demonstration of the unemployed outside his office, "It destroys him, he is under pressure and has difficulty functioning."

A Tough Opponent

Those close to Aridor see the watershed in his brief career as minister of finance as the Saturday when it became clear that the government did not accept his opinion about compensation for the Yamit evacuees, when he withdrew to his house and pondered his resignation. His wife, whom he consults often, not only because she is an economics teacher but also because she is a wise woman with a sharp mind and tongue, thought that "Yoram has to return home." A few senior officials, those close to him, came to his house in Ramat Eyal to ponder. Yoram Aridor did not resign. The next day he flew to London and returned from there "like new." Aridor understood then, say those close to him, that if he returned home he would have been forgotten on a shelf in the pantry growing cobwebs. He understood that there was no sense in knocking one's head against the wall and that a defeat in one battle does not teach a thing about results of the campaign. He returned to his office and reaped

the results: The crisis in the teacher's pay issue was concluded according to his wishes, and even the prime minister could not force him to be flexible in his stand for the benefit of Zevulun Hammer.

Aridor has learned many things since then, they say in the ministry of finance. He understood that the ministry is a great power center, that maybe there should not be anything like it in a democratic state; he also learned how to manipulate the great power instrument. The threads, he learned, lead toward any economic power center in the country and from it to any political power center. It is relatively easy to prevent the Labor Party from making waves about prices by using the "Tnuva" pressure group or the centrist members of the Labor Party. It is easy to twist the banks' arms and have them dance to the treasury's tune by delaying the issuance of bonds by one of the large banks.

Aridor learned the game fast and he plays it with the strength of a poker player with iron nerves. For example, bank discount, whose issues were delayed by Aridor until the large banks agreed to lower the interest rates. A long bargaining session, meetings, claims, threats of going to the High Court and the application of pressures that the minister of finance viewed in days past as intensive pressures, left Aridor in his original position. At the end, he received a final call from one of the directors of the biggest banks, who offered something "that cannot be refused" as a way out before the big explosion. Aridor quietly said, "No," and the bankers were quick to agree to all his conditions.

In the same manner, he hinted to the "Clal" people that their bonds would not be approved unless they promised that they would not let the employees of Beit-Shean, most of whom make their livelihood in enterprises owned by Clal, sink into unemployment. This already was a more perfect story. Aridor studied the economy and the economy studied Aridor and it was possible to conclude the matter, unlike the discount situation, without talk of pressure and a deal. Each side understood the other well and Aridor came out a winner.

He is a quick study, they say in the treasury, and it is surprising, because he is the first minister of finance (with the exception of Ehrlich, but it is difficult to seriously refer to Ehrlich as minister of finance) who did not emerge from the executive ranks and who was not an "organization man." Bringing Aridor to the treasury was a seemingly backward step as far as the office is concerned. Eshkol was tied to the establishment and experienced when he took the job. The same was true of Sapir, Rabinovitch, Sharaf. Even Yigal Hurwitz came to the treasury after substantial private economic experience and a long apprenticeship in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Aridor was a politician thrust into prominence and the senior officials of the office were entitled to fear what would happen during his tenure.

But Yoram Aridor learned quickly to be an "organization man" and he knows how to work the machine. In that, they say, is a similarity between him and Sapir, which gave him the title "Sapirdor." Neither had an ideological

program. Both are pragmatists down to their toes and both--and this is the main thing--understood the power that they hold. Since Aridor is considered even by his arch opponents as superintelligent, there are those who expect that he will find a way to increase the power of the system under his control and to perfect his power channels.

Nevertheless, he has faults, even in the eyes of those who are close to him. He often seems beholden to the terminology of the Histadrut, where he spent too many years. In their opinion, he is beholden to outdated concepts about prosperity, which are more suitable for the fifth floor of the Histadrut. In contrast to other ministers, he has no understanding of or interest in industry or agriculture. He is cool toward them and emotionally prefers the interests of employees over those of these branches. Even his most extreme adversary will admit that a comparison between Sapir and Aridor is inappropriate when referring to keeping regulations and procedures, and, of course, all refer to him as honest to the point of being irritating. Aridor the rationalist and businesslike is not the type to let matters be decided by slips of paper and plots in hallways and private homes. He acts with straight and clear lines.

Nevertheless, no one will claim that Aridor is a political hermit whose extreme uprightness borders on dissociating himself and his office from his political ties. He takes care of his supporters and those who are close to him; like everyone else, he gets them positions, jobs, a seat on the board of directors. The salient quality in that connection, as one of those closest to him told me: He went through a difficult period and whoever supported him can be sure that Yoram will fight to the end for him. The same source adds: "If I had to give advice to a young careerist, I would tell him to join Aridor's camp. It is a sure investment for many, many years."

There is no point in asking Aridor what his ambitions are. This secretive man will die before he opens his heart on the subject, but in his party there is a growing faction that believes that an investment in Aridor is worthwhile and that he has not said his last word. They agree in his party that this young man is surely going the leadership route, without pushing, without elbowing and without making waves. The general opinion is that Aridor and Levy will let Yitzhak Shamir be next in line for the leadership, after Menachem Begin. After Shamir, they say, there will be an interim leader. Aridor would easily win if there were such a contest against David Levy.

Yoram Aridor, son of a Revisionist father, whose picture (not that of Begin or Jabotinsky) is the only one hung in his office, the young man who fought with his classmates during the mandate period and the beginning of the state about political matters, the man who traversed--despite his relatively young age--a long and tiring political path in his party, sits now in the Ministry of Finance building, his future, despite all the denials, as a national leader.

ISRAEL

POLL ON ECONOMIC SITUATION SHOWS WIDESPREAD CONCERN

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Apr 82 p 3

[Article: "The Majority of the Public Thinks the Economic Situation is Worrisome"]

[Text] Toward the end of the fiscal year, the majority of the public believes that the economic situation is worrisome and that inflation will exceed 100 percent next year. This is evident from a national public opinion poll taken by the PORI Institute for HA'ARETZ.

Of those interviewed, 61.3 percent defined Israel's economic situation as worrisome as opposed to 28.9 percent who saw Israel's economic situation as acceptable and 7 percent who thought that Israel's economic situation is satisfactory (the remaining 2.8 percent had no opinion).

Those interviewed who belong to the more advanced sociological level demonstrated the greatest concern over the economic situation in the country. Among those with high educational levels, managers, professionals and those of European and American origin, 70 percent believe that Israel's economic situation is worrisome. Of those interviewed, 61.9 percent believe that the rate of inflation next year will be higher than 100 percent, and only 11 percent believe the minister of finance's forecast that the rate will not exceed 100 percent; 10.2 percent believe that the inflation rate will be lower than 100 percent. A substantial group, 16.9 percent, "don't know" what the projected inflation rate will be. The fear of an inflation rate higher than 100 percent exists mainly among those with lower levels of education, workers and those with low or average incomes.

The Present Economic Situation

As for their personal economic situation, 44.4 percent complained that the money that they earn is not enough for "finishing the month," compared with 6 months ago (HA'ARETZ 12 November 81) when 37.1 percent complained about it. Thus, there is an increase in the rate of those who complain about their personal economic situation.

The lower the level of those interviewed on the socioeconomic ladder, the higher the rate of those who complain that their personal economic situation

has worsened. Among those with low educational levels, workers and those with low income levels, the rate of complainers is higher than 50 percent (45.7 percent 6 months ago); 44.4 percent declared that their personal economic situation has not changed in the last 6 months and 5.5 percent (10.7 percent 6 months ago) even stated that their personal economic situation has improved.

Opposition to Cutbacks in Education and Defense

Rafael Gil, PORI's manager and the study's editor, noted that despite the gloomy economic picture one gets from the data, the majority of the public opposes cuts in the education and defense budgets: 78.1 percent of those interviewed said there is no justification for any cut in the education budget, and 60.7 percent said there was no justification for any cut in the defense budget.

Agreeing to a cut in the education budget was 12.9 percent, and another 3.1 percent were ready to accept a cut only if it could be proven "that there is waste in the educational system"; 5.9 percent said that they could voice no opinion about cuts in the education budget.

As for the defense budget, 23.3 percent agree to cutting it and another 4.6 percent are willing to accept cuts in the defense budget on the condition that "it will not hurt security" and that the cuts will be in management and transport and not in "essentials"; 11.4 percent refrained from voicing an opinion on the subject of a cut in the defense budget.

The poll encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were personally interviewed in the complete privacy of their homes.

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BRIEFS

TECHNICAL MANPOWER NEEDS--The rapid development in electronics and computers will cause a shortage of 750 electronic technicians annually in the next decade. The shortage will be felt most acutely in the area of electronics, electricity and astronomy. To overcome the projected shortage, the Ministry of Labor decided to speed up the rate of training electronic technicians and to recruit more students to these courses. The recruitment effort will be concentrated mainly among veterans of the armed forces, who have difficulty in finding employment, in the development towns, where there are many young unemployed, and among females who can be easily integrated in that occupation. At the same time, they began to update the curriculum at institutions for training technicians so that they could respond to future needs of the economy in the future. For that purpose, an advisory teaching committee has been established at the Government Institute for Technological Training. Members of the committee are industry representatives and the heads of institutions for technological training. The committee will work to match the curricula to the needs of science-based industries in the next decade. [Text] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 25 Mar 82 p 19] 9944

AIRCRAFT EXPORTS--For the first time in its history the aircraft industry will pass the half billion dollar mark in exports to countries around the world. According to totals for the fiscal year about to end, it is evident that exports of aircraft enterprises will surpass the sum of a half billion dollars, mainly from the sale of airplanes, sea missiles, military and civilian electronic products and from receipts for maintenance and repair. The main export article producing income for the aircraft industry is airplanes. Not long ago, the American magazine AVIATION WEEK revealed that the aircraft industry sold 12 Kfir planes to Ecuador and that it is about to complete negotiations for the sale of Kfir planes to Colombia. Last year, aircraft industry exports totaled \$350 million. The aircraft industry is engaged now in developing new planes: The "Lavi" and a civilian executive plane of the "Astra" type, which is a more advanced plane than the "Westwind 1124." Currently, the aircraft industry has sold 250 "Westwinds." The industry continues to sell "Arava"-type planes and tomorrow a commercial line is about to be opened in the United States that will activate four "Arava" planes. Prof Moshe Arens, Israel's ambassador to the United States, who will inaugurate this line, was the designer of the "Arva" plane. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 21 Mar 82 p 1] 9944

CSO: 4423/143

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

FISCAL, INVESTMENT, OVERALL ECONOMIC PLAN FIGURES DISCLOSED

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 12 Feb 82 p 4

[Article by 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Ilah: "Reading the Book Dealing with the Second Year of the 5-Year Plan - The Figures and Indicators"]

[Text] All during the last week of last month the plan for the second year of the modified second 5-year plan was the subject of detailed discussion at a joint meeting of the Political Bureau, Council of Ministers, and officials from the governorates, as well as at the meeting of the session of the Central Committee of the Yemen Socialist Party and the session held by the Supreme People's Council. Those at these meetings discussed the projects encompassed by the plan and the horizons of the progress being made by our country in economic and social development based on the given facts of the present situation as well as our country's capabilities in terms of financing and implementation [of the projects].

One could say that these discussions which concerned this year's plan represented the taking of an important stand with regard to our economic and financial problem and with regard to how to achieve more success by means of taking steps to improve administrative and economic performance and utilizing more methods which help to complete the projects in a better fashion.

In order that our readers become familiar with what the 1982 plan includes, we are going to present to them a series of articles concerning all branches of the national economy, giving figures and indicators, and we will allow the analysis of the figures to be done by specialists in economics.

The Plan and Planning

During the last few months the Ministry of Planning has been busily engaged in formulating the plan for the second year of the modified second 5-year plan. During that short space of time the ministry, by means of making great efforts, managed to conduct consultations with the [other] ministries and organizations concerning the projects which were possible to include in the plan, taking into account development priorities, the volume of investments which can be absorbed, and the availability of a number of factors which promote implementation [of the projects] such as the availability of studies, designs, capability of implementation, and financing for a number of the projects included [in the plan].

In addition to this the Ministry of Planning concentrated on creating a degree of proportional relation and balance between the production and service sectors, integration of the branches of the national economy in the governorates, and efforts to complete the projects which were not completed last year.

There is no doubt that the ministry faced a number of difficulties in its efforts to convince a number of the officials [of the wisdom of its point of view] when curtailing some of the projects or allocating, for the plan, funds which were less than what was proposed, or when [dealing with] requests for investment in projects which were not shown to be economically feasible.

On the basis of this objective point of view, the experience accumulated by the Ministry of Planning, and last year's indicators of implementation [of the projects], [those responsible for the plan], after exhausting efforts, were able to determine that the funds invested in the national economy in 1982 would total 145,269,500 Yemeni dinars, that is, an increase of 32.2 percent over the investments which were expected to have been utilized last year.

Here it should be pointed out that the total investments for all of the projects proposed to the Ministry of Planning amount to more than the financing that can be provided. But the Ministry of Planning has been able to review many matters and take into consideration many subjective and objective circumstances. This has put the ministry in the position of being responsible for responding to all remarks and demands made by [the various] ministries and governorates.

In order for us to explore the objectives of the plan for the current year, we must take a look at the (estimated) indicators which reflect the achievements attained in 1981. This will enable readers and people basically interested in the matter to follow the growth rates and thus be able to assess the progress of our economic development.

High Growth Rates

The Ministry of Planning's economic analysis indicates that the years 1980-81 represented a relatively positive example of a high level of economic performance. During those years steadfast and steadily increasing growth took place in a number of branches of the economy and economic activities.

Total expenditures were 52 million dinars in 1979, 74.2 million dinars in 1980, and may have totaled about 110 million dinars in 1981. This represents high growth rates, and the real increase in the GNP last year may have totalled 11.1 percent, that is, 339.2 million dinars (according to 1980 prices). Gross national income increased 12.1 percent and average per capita income went up to 91.4 dinars, which represents a real increase of 9.2 percent over 1980.

The report indicates that all branches of material production achieved a noticeable increase in their production with the exception of the fish production industry whose production decreased by about 37 percent (and the reasons for this decrease will be pointed out in future articles).

Industrial production went up 8.7 percent, agricultural production went up 9.3 percent, production in the building and construction industry went up 53.3 percent, production in transport and communications increased 11.9 percent, and there was an increase of 1.3 percent in commerce and the restaurant sector. In addition to this, there was change which favored public ownership sectors as far as participation by the [various] forms of ownership in production was concerned. There was an increase of 2.1 percent in the number of workers employed, and there was an increase of approximately 16.1 percent in productivity per worker in the various branches [of the economy] in 1981 as compared with 1980. There was also an increase in the percentages of sharing by the [state] organizations in the net profits earned through development. Also, there was an increase in the volume of commodity trade of local products, and due to this increase it came to total about 29.4 percent of the total value of commodities bought and sold in the retail market. This equals 113.2 dinars per capita (according to 1980 prices), whereas this figure was 104.8 dinars for 1980.

The Plan for 1982

The objective of the 1982 plan is to achieve a large increase in national production--an increase of 19.1 percent, which means 445 million dinars in 1982 (using 1981 prices) as opposed to 373.5 million dinars in 1981, and an increase in the gross national income of 19.2 percent, that is, an increase of from 191.1 million dinars [in 1981] to 227.8 million dinars [in 1982]. This also means that production sectors will be accounting for 63.2 percent of the national production [in 1982] as opposed to 59.9 percent of the national production [in 1981].

Furthermore, the per capita average of the gross national income will increase by approximately 16.3 percent--from 97.8 dinars [in 1981] to 112.7 dinars [in 1982] (according to 1981 prices).

The plan emphasizes that public and cooperative forms of ownership should play a leading role in the various sectors of material production. The objective is that these sectors participate in national production in terms of the following total amounts, in millions of dinars: the government sector, 170.5 million dinars (42.2 percent); the cooperative sector, 27.8 million dinars (7 percent); the mixed sector, 13.4 million dinars (3.4 percent); and the private sector, 183 million dinars (46.4 percent).

The Volume of Investments

Approximately 145.2 million dinars of investments have been allocated for the current year of 1982. This represents an increase of 32 percent over the volume of expenditures expected [to have been utilized] in 1981. Electricity, port, and housing projects account for a large degree of the investments, and 56.4 percent of the investments will be utilized for building and construction in various fields. In view of the great efforts being made to increase local resources, about 25 percent of the total of these investments will be allotted for these resources.

The number of workers employed will increase from 452,600 in 1981 to 467,700 [in 1982]. It is also expected that the productivity per worker in all branches of the economy will increase 16.5 percent over what it was last year.

The plan also has the objective of increasing the volume of foreign trade by 8.5 percent--that is, from 287.4 million dinars [in 1981] to 311.7 million dinars [in 1982]. Commodity imports will increase from 271 million dinars [in 1981] to 295 million dinars [in 1982] (according to 1981 prices). Exports and reexports will increase from 16.4 million dinars [in 1981] to 16.7 million dinars [in 1982]. In addition to this, the volume of retail commodity trade will increase from about 229.8 million dinars [in 1981] to 247.9 million dinars [in 1982], that is, an increase of 7.9 percent. This means that the per capita share of this will increase from 117.7 dinars [in 1981] to 123.7 dinars in 1982 (according to 1981 prices). Perhaps it is important to mention that, as was said by Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, the secretary general of the Central Committee of the Yemen Socialist Party, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council, and prime minister, in his press communique dealing with the work accomplished by the session of the Supreme People's Council, achievement of the objectives of the plan for the current year will necessitate "the utilization of all capacities and resources in first-class fashion, the taking of various steps to improve work productivity and raise efficiency and performance levels, and the adoption of the approach of programming and organizing work."

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CSO: 4404/355

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

PRODUCTION SECTOR FIGURES FORECASTED

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 14 Feb 82 p 4

[Text] The sector of industry is of major importance within the framework of the second 5-year plan. Last year an increase was achieved in the volume of production and most industrial installations worked with greater efficiency, whether this involved improvement in their products, the appearance of new products, or [better] marketing.

Statistics quoted by the Ministry of Planning in its assessment of this sector indicate that it is anticipated that the volume of industrial production of last year will total 69.6 million Yemeni dinars (according to 1981 prices). It was the public sector which played the leading role in last year's production process. Production by the various sectors was as follows: the public sector, 43.4 million dinars (62.3 percent); the mixed sector, 9.1 million dinars (13.1 percent); the cooperative sector, 0.4 million dinars (0.6 percent); and the private sector, 16.7 million dinars (24 percent).

It could be pointed out that the increase in participation by the public sector is attributable to the interest which was shown in improving its efficiency and the fact that new capacities and resources were put into operation.

On the basis of these indicators, the plan for the year 1982 has the objective of increasing the volume of industrial production by 21 percent over the year 1981, whereas the anticipated increase, according to the [5-year] plan book, was 12.4 percent. This means that the volume of production will now be increasing by the following percentages over last year's production: the public sector, 24.9 percent; the mixed sector, 14.3 percent; the cooperative sector, 25 percent; and the private sector, 14.4 percent.

New Products

One of the objectives of the plan, to which 84.2 million dinars have been allocated, is to meet the population's growing need for goods and commodities. New products will appear such as telephone apparatuses, plastic utensils, household utensils, ornamented rugs, and doors and windows made of aluminum. In addition to this, an animal fodder plant will be put into operation and a mechanized bakery will be put into operation in al-Mansurah, the extraction

of salt will be developed, and an oxygen plant will be built--and this will also help to create a surplus for foreign export.

In order to shed some light on [the situation in] the various branches of industry, we shall proceed to deal with them in detail:

Electric Power

Electric power is very important in a country's social and economic development. For this reason a great deal of attention has been devoted to electric power during recent years, [and the objective has been] to meet the requirements of general development, whether in the branches of the national economy or in order to meet the needs of consumption by the population.

A total of 17.2 million dinars of investments has been allocated this year to electricity, that is, 11.8 percent of the total investments of the plan for the year.

This year an electric power station in al-Mansurah will be put into operation, and its capacity will be 60 megawatts. Also the Hadramawt Valley station, with a capacity of 16 megawatts, will be put into operation. Furthermore, three generators will be installed in Socotra and Hawf, the above-ground cables will be expanded, and a number of substations will be set up in various governorates where the demand for electricity is greatly increasing.

Thus production will go up to 460.6 million kilowatt-hours, and this represents an increase of 147 percent over the year 1980. Electricity production by the end of last year (1981) was estimated at 394 million kilowatt-hours.

Planning sources point out that electricity consumption will increase by the following percentages over last year: agriculture, 19.6 percent; industry, 5.6 percent; construction, 27.3 percent; and [consumption by] the population, 17.9 percent.

By the end of the current year there will be a total of 145.8 megawatts of electric power as opposed to 88.8 megawatts last year, and this represents an increase of 64.2 percent. This means that difficulties [associated with lack of electric power] will be overcome, and electric power can be guaranteed [to be available] throughout the year. Also, the number of people working in the electricity industry will increase from 1,971 to 2,182.

Water

Great efforts are being made in the field of water production, and huge investments are being made in this area. This is being done both in an effort to find new sources of water and to implement projects that are going on in the cities and in the rural areas. Last year there was a considerable improvement in the capital city's water supply in particular. Water production last year was 33.7 million cubic meters, that is, 105 percent more than in 1980. But this still is not enough to meet all of the water supply demands, but this is due to circumstances beyond our control.

What is included in this year's program?

In order to develop the central water supply, it has been decided this year to put in a water pipe system which is 827 kilometers long and to dig 33 [new] wells, in addition to renovating the water systems in Aden, al-Mukalla, and other areas. Water production will total 37.5 million cubic meters, representing an increase of 111 percent over last year. A total of 5.7 million dinars has been allocated for this purpose.

It should also be pointed out that we will be seeing the beginning of the implementation of some principal projects such as the Aden water project and the Mukalla water project.

It is anticipated that the number of persons working [in the water production industry] will increase from 1,134 to 1,183.

The Processing Industries - Oil Refining

It is anticipated that [this year] 4.1 million tons [of oil] will be refined, as compared with 3.4 million tons last year. Work done by the refinery depends on factors such as obtaining the crude oil to refine. As far as development of the refinery is concerned, studies will be conducted which will deal with improving its storage capacity, expanding its marine installations, improving its production pattern, and setting up an electric power station. Also, the workers' housing will be completed. A total of 2.5 million dinars has been allocated to implement these projects.

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CSO: 4404/355

NEED FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF FINANCIAL MARKET SUGGESTED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 35, Feb 82 pp 42-43

[Article: "The Development of Joint-Stock Companies in Saudi Arabia and the Need for a Financial Market"]

[Text] Saudi Joint-Stock Companies As of 1980:
98 Companies, 186 Million Shares, and a Total Capital
of 33.6 Billion Saudi Riyals.

Some of the Drawbacks of Not Having a Stock Market:
Difficulty in Bringing Buyers and Sellers Together,
Differences in the Prices of Shares from One Place to
Another, Lack of Buying and Selling of the Shares of
Some Companies, and Ignorance on the Part of the
Shareholders of the Value of Their Shares.

With the steady increase in the number of joint-stock companies in Saudi Arabia, and in view of the great development in the volume of their capital and the mass of shares available for buying and selling, there has been a growing demand among people in business circles for the creation of an organized financial market as a necessary prerequisite for developing and establishing the form and shape of the joint-stock companies. In response to this demand the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Riyadh has prepared a preliminary working paper concerning the development of joint-stock companies in Saudi Arabia and the need for a securities exchange. In view of the seriousness of this subject and in an effort to provide a useful service to our readers, we are hereby publishing the most important things included in this paper.

The modern advancement which has been introduced into Saudi Arabia and which has embraced all aspects of Saudi life has been a very influential factor in Saudi Arabia's commercial prosperity, industrial advancement, and increase in development projects. As such activities have increased in number and the consequences thereof have become greater, individuals have felt the need to combine their efforts and pool their resources when engaging in work and production. One way they have done this is to establish companies which possess sufficient financial resources and administrative and technical capabilities to enable these individuals to deal with these consequences. The result of this has been the appearance of the joint-stock companies with a

minimum capital of 1 million Saudi riyals, divided up into shares of equal value which are put up for public subscription and may be bought and sold among shareholders.

The scope of activity of the joint-stock companies has increased in a very short time, and they have come to be concerned with all aspects of financial, commercial, and industrial activity. With the increase in number of joint-stock companies there has been an urgent need to establish an all-inclusive system of laws concerning them. As a result, the Companies Law, which was promulgated in accordance with Council of Ministers' Decision Number 185 dated 17/3/1385 A.H. and ratified by Royal Decree Number M/6 dated 22/3/1385 A.H., includes all of the provisions dealing with companies--including joint-stock companies. Its provisions deal with how companies are to be established, terminated, and liquidated, how they are to pursue their business activities, and the ways in which they are to be controlled and overseen in an effort to look out for the public interest and to safeguard the capital belonging to individuals which is at the disposal of these companies. The provisions of this law also stipulate the imposition of penalties for the violation of any of the rules covered by the Companies Law.

The result of the application of the provisions of the Companies Law has been the establishment of all business conduct and relations of the joint-stock companies with other parties, such as suppliers, clients, and banks, and the establishment of companies' relations with their shareholders. But one important matter remains unsettled, and this matter concerns the method of circulating the companies' shares when this involves a shareholder who wants to sell his shares to another party who wants to buy them. According to Article 102 of the Companies Law: "When nominal shares are bought and sold, the transactions are recorded in the shareholders' register which is kept by the company and which includes the shareholders' names, nationalities, and places of residence, as well as the numbers of the shares and the amounts paid for them. These amounts are recorded on each share, and transfer of ownership of the registered shares, in the presence of the company or other party, is only reckoned as valid beginning with the date of their entry in the above-mentioned register, and the shares are transferred to their shareholders as soon as they are delivered to them."

The System of Buying and Selling Securities Which Is Currently in Effect

In view of the fact that there is as yet no organized market for buying and selling securities in Saudi Arabia, transfer of ownership of shares from one shareholder to another takes place in the following manner:

The shareholder who wants to sell shares makes this known by putting an advertisement in one of the daily newspapers, or he sends them to a bank which deals in the purchase and sale of securities by serving as an intermediary between the buyer and seller in return for a commission, or else he sends them to the office of a broker who deals in buying and selling securities--the purpose being to accomplish the task of finding someone who wants to purchase these shares.

After the meeting between the buyer and seller takes place after utilizing one of the above-mentioned three methods, and after they come to final agreement concerning the price that the shares offered for sale will be sold at, the two parties (the buyer and the seller) go to the joint-stock company where they record the transfer of ownership of these shares from the buyer to the seller in the shareholders' register which is kept by the company for this purpose.

Assessment of the System of Buying and Selling Securities Which Is Currently in Effect

The Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Riyadh, during the preparation of a study concerning the securities exchange and its importance in serving joint-stock companies, sounded out the opinions of those in charge of the joint-stock companies in Saudi Arabia concerning how effective the current system of buying and selling securities is. Most of them expressed the opinion that the current system is deficient and does not promote the activity of buying and selling securities, for the following reasons:

1. It is difficult to bring together the buyers and sellers of the shares, and this leads to slow business transactions and restricts the buying and selling to relatives and friends. Most of those wanting to purchase shares are unable to find out how many shares are being put up for sale or what their market value is.
2. The prices of the shares do not correspond to the actual volume of supply and demand. In fact, the price of a share often differs from place to place, and consequently does not reflect the share's real price at which it should be bought and sold.
3. The shares of some companies have not been bought and sold at all, in spite of the fact that a long time has elapsed since the companies have been established and in spite of the production efficiency of the companies. This is basically attributable to the inadequacy of the present system of buying and selling and is due to the fact that there is no organized financial market.
4. Many of those in charge of companies are ignorant of the market value of the shares of their companies because there is no standard system for buying and selling shares.

It is clear from the above that the current system of buying and selling shares has failed to keep pace with the development which has occurred in the joint-stock companies. For this reason, many of those who are in charge of joint-stock companies have expressed a desire to see the creation of a securities market such as those which exist in not only most of the advanced countries of the world, but also in most of the world's developing countries.

Development of the Joint-Stock Companies

The first joint-stock company in Saudi Arabia was founded in 1354 A.H. (that is, in the late forties). It was the Arab Automobile Company, and its function was that of providing transportation to pilgrims going to Mecca. The company's

capital at that time was 21 million Saudi riyals. More joint-stock companies were then founded after that, and by the end of the year 1374 A.H. six such companies had been founded and their total capital was about 943 million riyals.

During the years 1375-84 A.H. 11 joint-stock companies were established, the capital of which was about 2,012,000,000 riyals. Thus there was a total number of 17 such joint-stock companies by the end of the year 1384 A.H., and their total capital was 2,955,000,000 riyals.

During the period 1385-94 A.H. the number of joint-stock companies greatly increased. Thirty-seven companies were founded, and their total capital was about 3,554,000,000 riyals.

By the end of this period the total number of joint-stock companies was 54, and their total capital was 6,509,000,000 riyals.

During the period 1395-1400 A.H. 44 more joint-stock companies were founded, with a total capital of approximately 27,125,000,000 riyals. This brought the total number of joint-stock companies, by the year 1400 A.H., to 98, their total capital was about 33,634,000,000 Saudi riyals, and their total number of shares was 186,600,000.

It should be mentioned that the huge size of the capital of the companies which were established during the most recent period is attributable to the existence of a number of large companies such as the Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation which was established by OAPEC and whose capital was 3.6 billion riyals, and the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation [Sabic] which was established with a capital of 10 billion riyals.

By means of an analysis of the economic activities engaged in by the joint-stock companies, we clearly see that the areas of activity of these companies include all types of economic activities, but they participate in some activities more than others. About 30 percent of them are active in industry, 19 percent in the field of electricity, 17 percent in the field of petroleum, 15 percent in transportation, 9 percent in building and construction materials, 8 percent are banks and investment companies, and the remaining 2 percent are active in the field of tourism.

It should be mentioned that in spite of the increase in the number of joint-stock companies and increase in their invested capital, this development does not match the great economic potential which Saudi Arabia possesses. This may be attributable to the fact that Saudi investors are hesitating to invest their capital in joint-stock companies because there is no organized securities market which endeavors to publish sound information concerning the joint-stock companies and there is no organized method of buying and selling their shares--and this is something which is necessary for the investors in order that they have peace of mind.

The Benefits of Having a Securities Exchange in Saudi Arabia

There is no doubt that a securities exchange is a legitimate and practical framework by which to regulate the process of buying and selling securities.

The purchase and sale of securities through direct contact between buyers and sellers provides only limited opportunities for learning about the market situation and finding out actual prevailing prices. This can also bring harm to the shareholders who are not sufficiently aware of the market situation. In a case such as this the establishment of a securities exchange would regulate the buying and selling of securities and would make it more just and fair for both buyers and sellers. It would also give more confidence to investors, give them more peace of mind concerning their capital, and would give rise to more development and growth for the joint-stock companies themselves.

The following are some of the advantages which an organized securities market (stock exchange) could provide to shareholders, companies, and the government:

A stock exchange would permit buyers and sellers to meet in a single place known to all of them, and would save them the trouble of having to seek each other out.

The value of the securities, or market price, would be determined on the basis of supply and demand and there would be no opportunity for it to be affected by any other various factors.

A stock exchange would provide all basic data and information about new companies which are putting their shares up for public subscription. This information would constitute a sufficient basis for providing a clear idea about these companies, their merits, their constitutions, and their articles of incorporation so that people could have confidence in companies to which they are going to entrust their money.

If a stock exchange were established, the system of ownership regarding cessions [of property], inheritances, and gifts would become standard for all of the joint-stock companies. This would save the companies and individuals the trouble of having to ascertain the validity of ownership of the shares, the validity of sales contracts, and having to check the background of buyers and sellers. This would also eliminate variations in contracts, conditions, and official certifications.

Since the securities exchange would be subject to government control, this would eliminate the speculation based on conjecture which harms the interests of investors.

The regulation of the purchase and sale of securities would, of course, increase confidence on the part of shareholders and people desiring to invest in the joint-stock companies. This would consequently lead to development of the joint-stock companies and to an increase in their efficiency and capability of taking part in Saudi Arabia's economic and social development plans.

From the above it is clear that there is an urgent and definite need for Saudi Arabia to have an organized securities market. During the last 2 years Saudi ministries and government bodies concerned with matters of finance,

economy, commerce, industry, and planning have devoted increasing attention to the subject of establishing a securities exchange. This indicates that the day is not far off when we will see a securities exchange engaging in its daily job of regulating the securities market.

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CSO: 4404/354

AGRICULTURE MINISTER ON ROLE OF FARM SECTOR, NEED FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 261, 20 Feb 82 pp 44-45

[Interview with 'Abd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh, Saudi minister of agriculture, by 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil: "What Can Agriculture Give to Saudi Arabia?"; date and place not specified]

[Text] In Less Than 4 Years Wheat Production Has increased from 18,000 Tons to 400,000 Tons. The Strategy of [Achieving] Self-Sufficiency in Local Wheat Production Is Being Applied.

The Cost of Agricultural Development Is High, But Its Benefits Go Beyond Mere Calculations.

Saudi Agricultural Development is Bringing [the Nation's] Capital and People Back to Agriculture. We have Begun Exporting Some Vegetables, and We Will Be Playing a Major Role in the Gulf Area's Agricultural Integration.

Intensive Capital [Investment] and Modern Mechanization Are Solving the Labor Force Problem.

Can the sector of agriculture and animal wealth play a significant role in the building, development, and growth of the Saudi economy? Is it legitimate or not to aspire to this in a desert country such as Saudi Arabia? Who is determining this, and how is it being determined? These questions were the focus of an interview conducted by our colleague 'Abd al-Karim Khalil, editor in chief of AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-IQTISADI [the business and economics section of the publication AL-MUSTAQBAL], with Dr 'Abd al-Rahman Al Shaykh, the Saudi minister of agriculture. This interview was one of a series of interviews held with a number of Saudi ministers and officials (see AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-IQTISADI--Number 90, 30 January 1982; Number 91, 6 February 1982; and Number 92, 13 February 1982). The interview was as follows:

[Question] The Saudi economy enjoys--and, at the same time, suffers from--a particular structure which forces one to view its development and the development of its sectors from particular non-traditional points of view. On the basis of this fact, how do you view agriculture in this economy both in the present and in the future?

[Answer] This particular structure of the Saudi economy makes us view the sector of agriculture in this economy from a point of view which takes into consideration both the objectives which all nations and societies have in this regard as well as the particular objectives, approaches, and programs which are suitable for the potential which exists in Saudi Arabia's economy and the needs for developing this economy.

The sectors of agriculture, and the animal wealth sectors connected with them, grow and are developed in all societies and nations on the basis of pursuing the objectives of having a secure food supply, increasing the GNP, increasing export capability, and decreasing the need for imports. In Saudi Arabia we too are interested in pursuing these objectives for the Saudi economy, and in this regard we are particularly concerned with the sector of agriculture and animal wealth, we are generally concerned with developing the Saudi economy to cope with the post-petroleum period, and we are also concerned with concentrating Saudi Arabia's economic and social growth within a framework which is in harmony with the heritage of Saudi Arabia's society.

[Question] This means that, within the Saudi economy as a whole, you are greatly concerned about agriculture and animal wealth and that you have great hopes for this sector in spite of the fact that we know that Saudi Arabia is a desert or non-agricultural country and in spite of the fact that we all know that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve great objectives in this regard.

[Answer] We are, in fact, greatly concerned about this, and we certainly do have great hopes in this regard. Notwithstanding the discussion concerning the validity of what is generally regarded as true and what is known concerning the difficulties and problems faced by any process of development, the results which we have achieved and are achieving confirm the validity of our concerns and prove to us that our hopes are not without foundation.

[Question] Could you give us an idea about some of the results which have been achieved or which are expected to be achieved?

[Answer] Certainly. Let us take, for example, wheat which is the most important strategic agricultural product which is on the list of concerns of any nation which is concerned about having a secure food supply. Although Saudi Arabia only produced 18,000 tons of wheat during the 1398-99 A.H. season (1978-79), the next year this production went up to 52,000 tons, last season's production was 140,000 tons, and it is expected that wheat production this season will total about, or slightly more than, 400,000 tons.

Not only do these figures indicate record annual percentages of increase in production--increases of 170 percent during the last 2 years, and an expected increase of 180 percent this year over last year. They are also very significant when looked at from the point of view of Saudi Arabia's annual wheat consumption, which totals nearly 700,000 tons.

More important than all of this is the fact that our planning in this field and the success which we expect from our programs in this area indicate that we will be self-sufficient in wheat 3 years from now, not counting this year. Does this not clearly show that we have been successful?

[Question] Of course. But has there been, and will there be, as much success with other agricultural crops as there has been, and will be, with wheat? Or do you consider this success to be an important particular success which has nevertheless been only a partial success?

[Answer] Our strategic program in the sector of agriculture and wheat production is proceeding along with other programs of particular importance which are concerned with the production of fodder and, consequently, the development of the animal wealth sector in the areas of cattle and poultry and increasing this sector's meat and dairy production. We have clear plans in this regard for achieving various particular degrees of self-sufficiency in each area or in each commodity. This is attested to by the growth in our cattle and poultry farms, the expansion in their production, and their increase in productivity.

What we have achieved in this realm has caused us to effect a change in our type of participation in, and contribution toward, the world food program. Previously our contribution was only a monetary one. But last year we began to make contributions in terms of goods and furnished 10,000 tons of canned high-quality dates. We feel that this type of contribution is better for those nations of Asia and Africa which are the beneficiaries of these contributions, and we have begun work toward developing our contributions in terms of goods and expanding them in the near future so that they will include not only dates, but also some types of vegetables. We have also begun exporting some vegetables to our fellow-Arab nations in the Gulf area. The evidence enables me to say that Saudi Arabia will be playing a fundamental role in the implementation of some of the operations of agricultural integration among the Gulf nations.

[Question] But we notice that development of agriculture and animal wealth is taking place at very high cost, and some people consider that the cost is unjustified. The support price at which you are buying wheat from Saudi farmers is five times the world price. And in addition to this support price there are other expenditures in connection with agricultural and water facilities and installations as well as a great deal of financial credit and credit in commodities which is granted.

[Answer] That is true. But there are many justifications for this and, in fact, there are actual reasons for this which involve more than justifications.

Concerning this matter our premise is not only that of attempting to achieve a secure food supply. We are also concerned with the fact that agriculture is a vital sector and that it is one of the chief foundations of economic growth. Of course, this presumes that there is potential for it.

We do have the potential for it, although unlimited support on the part of the government is required--and the government realizes that such unlimited support can only be provided at very high cost. However, the government realizes that it is necessary to pay this high cost in order to develop one of the vital sectors in the Saudi economy.

This support is granted not only by means of purchasing, at support prices, products which the government wants to increase the production of. Such support is also provided by means of furnishing free land to farmers (in accordance with the fallow land law), granting them long-term loans with no interest payments, and offering them financial aid for the purchase of agricultural machinery which amounts to as much as 25 percent of the price of the machinery.

This support has not only helped to increase Saudi Arabia's agricultural resources and animal wealth. It has also led to having capital once again be invested in agriculture and led people who are capable of utilizing and working the land to settle in these lands once again. There is no need to elaborate on the numerous benefits which this will bring.

[Question] It has been noticed recently that you attach great importance to the National Agricultural Development Company [NADC].

[Answer] The fact is that this company is still another indication of the success which has been achieved and is being achieved in agricultural development in Saudi Arabia. At the same time, it is going to be one of our principal means of pushing forward the process of agricultural development.

It is an indication of this success in view of the fact that 126,000 of our citizens, all of whom are farmers, have become shareholders of the company by means of public subscription. The fact that these people have been eager to purchase shares in an agricultural development company indicates that there has been a lot of response to the government's efforts to get its citizens to become interested in agriculture and invest in it. There would have been no such response if it had not been for the positive results which our citizens or farmers expect from agriculture.

The company did not just suddenly appear. It was established as a result of a study made of agricultural potential. Among other things the company engages in the discovery of [new] agricultural regions, it is concerned with developing the soil and solving water supply problems, and it deals with the marketing situation in order to help small farmers. The company will be the driving force behind, and the spearhead of, agricultural development and will lead the march toward achieving this development. The company does not compete with any other project or program. These functions are such that they have, from the beginning, impelled the government to participate in them in order to have them get under way. However, the government will give up its share in the company and sell it to the private sector after the company gets under way and begins to earn a profit.

So far the company has progressed very well. Forty thousand hectares of land in Wadi al-Dawasir have been put at its disposal, and it has already begun cultivating 10 percent of this land. Later on other lands in other areas will also be put at its disposal. The success of this experiment has led us to create another such company which is right now being set up in the Ha'il area. It is called the Ha'il Joint-Stock Agricultural Development Company, and a royal decree was issued granting approval for the licensing of the company.

[Question] Naturally you have faced, and still are facing, various problems in this area, particularly problems concerning water supply. What are the most important developments in the situation in this regard?

[Answer] There are various aspects to our water supply problem. Although Saudi Arabia generally is in a region of sparse rainfall and lacks rivers, it nevertheless has reserves of ground water which are suitable for agriculture. But we have had a problem in this area concerning channeling the reserves of ground water toward public use for household purposes and the like.

It has turned out that channeling the water toward these uses has had an effect on agriculture in areas which traditionally engage in agriculture, for example, Medina, Wadi Fatimah, Khalil, 'Asir, etc. Agriculture in some of these areas nearly came to a standstill, and other areas have experienced inactivity or decreasing activity in agriculture. But we became aware of this problem, and this fact led us to adopt a plan based on rationing the consumption by households and other places of the desalinized water which Saudi Arabia has expanded the production of in accordance with extensive programs and rationing the use of ground water for agricultural purposes. This enabled agriculture to be revived and to grow once more.

Of course the dams which have been set up have helped to solve part of the problem, and we hope that other parts of the problem will also be solved. We also hope that the necessary water will be available for agricultural development and that the soil will be made suitable for utilizing other sources of water as development takes place of our knowledge and technology dealing with all aspects of agriculture. Up till now it has been clear and certain that a large part of the problem can be dealt with by means of the special concern which the third [5-year development] plan has devoted to developing sources of ground water.

[Question] What about the labor force? Are the workers Saudis? Or are you utilizing foreign labor as is done in the construction and other sectors?

[Answer] I do not know whether or not it was a matter of necessity or creativity. Our "creation" in this field was adopting the well-known economic principle which is the utilization of abundant capital and a small labor force. We have used intensive capital investment in place of labor.

Thus agricultural developments in Saudi Arabia have been based on the utilization of modern scientific mechanization, especially in large-scale agriculture and in all phases of cultivation including planting, plowing, pivotal irrigation, and harvesting.

[Question] In light of the experience which you have had, and in light of what you know as a result of your programs which are being implemented or which are under study for future years, how do you visualize the agricultural situation in Saudi Arabia 10 years from now or, for example, by the end of the eighties?

[Answer] In order to be very brief and not go into diverse details, I can sum this matter up in two points:

1. The process of integration of agricultural resources and animal wealth between the GCC nations will get under way and will grow. This process is expected to achieve a great deal.
2. Our agricultural situation 10 years from now will be completely different from what it is today. Certainly in the future the agricultural sector will be better off and the country will be better off in terms of meeting its needs and achieving integration of the foundations of its economy.

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CSO: 4404/354

UN ECONOMIC COUNCIL TO STUDY REPORT ON REFUGEES

Khartoum SUNA in English No 4107, 26 Apr 82 pp 6-9

[Text] United Nations, April 26 (SUNA)--The Economic and Social Council has before it a report on the condition of refugees in Sudan.

The report before the council on this subject is in response to a General Assembly request to the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], to send follow-up missions to make feasibility studies to see how the capacity of the country's government to solve the refugee problem could be strengthened.

The report states that recent influxes have brought the number of refugees to an estimated 550,000. The presence of such an important refugee population had further deteriorated the conditions of providing normal educational and social services to the local population in the areas where refugee concentrations constitute an additional onerous burden to already overstressed services.

There was need, therefore, the report states, to review all the services available in the areas of refugee concentrations, relating them to the requirements of the local populations, so as to evolve comprehensive, effective and adequate services that could appropriately cater for the needs of the local populations and the refugees. There was also need to ensure that governmental agencies are involved in proper delivery of educational and social services.

The report then lists needs in the area of education and states that the mission recommended an education services development project should be conceived and launched, preferably by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in cooperation with UNHCR.

Regarding social development and welfare services, the report states that the National Refugee Fund that was established pursuant to a recommendation of the 1980 International Conference on Refugees in the Sudan did not seem to have carried out the foreseen activities. It goes on to say that the number, diversity and frequency of visiting missions needed to be looked into to avoid useless strain on logistic support and field personnel who must assist the missions.

The report also lists the development assistance projects proposed for the Sudan in the areas of education and social development/welfare services, as well as proposed projects for medium-term and long-term assistance.

William Richard Smyser, Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees of UNHCR, said his organization's programmes in the Horn of Africa and the Sudan exemplified the range of options and solutions available in the process from relief to durable solutions, UNHCR cooperated closely with the government, enlisted the support of other agencies of the United Nations system and drew on the resources of a host of non-governmental organizations.

He went on to say that during the early part of 1981 drought dramatically gave way to heavy rains which led to flooding in the southern region. Delivery of food supplies had been disrupted and, despite emergency airlifts of food, malnutrition had become a serious problem as of May, and a malaria outbreak in one region hit hardest mainly at children. In mid-year, once the succession of emergencies was over, the situation began to reverse itself, he stated, and food delivery and distribution improved and malnutrition largely disappeared.

By the end of 1981, he went on, the state of emergency of the first three years of operations' in Somalia had been contained, and UNHCR in 1982 would continue to concentrate on providing basic needs to refugees, and to emphasize longer-term, income-generating projects.

He stated that it was hoped refugees now in camps would opt to return to their country of origin--if any remained, they should ultimately be involved in productive activities.

As to the Sudan, he said despite its economic difficulties, it had maintained a generous policy of welcoming refugees. The government estimated there were 550,000 refugees in 1981, an increase of 40,000 over the year before, affecting mainly the south of the country. The UNHCR continued to provide assistance to the large refugee population. After suitable feasibility studies, nine new settlements had been established and were scheduled for completion in 1982, he said, and work was due to begin by June on a water supply system in one area of Eastern Sudan, in preparation for the settlement of about 20,000 refugees.

The high commissioner, he stated, had also organized in 1981 a mission on the development of integrated housing programmes, and decided to expand the town of Port Sudan to benefit both nationals and refugees.

He said an interagency mission had identified as the main areas where assistance was required as education, social development and welfare.

He said over 19.8 million dollars had been allocated by UNHCR in 1981 for various kinds of assistance to refugees in the Sudan.

Turning to the special programme of assistance to returnees to Ethiopia, he concluded, 1.3 million dollars had been allocated in November 1980 for a pilot project under which up to 10,000 returnees were to be assisted.

BRIEFS

GOVERNOR 'ABDALLAH'S ADDRESS--Atbara, April 21, (SUNA)--Northern Region Governor 'Abdallah Ahmad 'Abdallah announced that studies and survey works of the roads to link Egypt and the Northern Region were agreed upon in accordance with the programme of integration between the two countries. He said integration with Egypt had gone a long way and added that his Finance and Economy Minister and Egyptian officials had reached agreement on several issues of integration. Dr 'Abdallah said some international establishments had expressed willingness to participate in the building of Al Hamadab dam. He said a Swedish delegation visited the site proposed for the dam a few days ago. He also spoke on the various studies and activities of his government in the domains of roads, bridges and agriculture. Dr 'Abdallah pledged to implement Numayri Economic Recovery Programme and stressed that all forms of corruption and greed would be uprooted. He hailed the performance of the Region's Ministers and the Regional People's Assembly. Dr Abdalla was addressing the first meeting of the Northern Region's SSU Committee held at Al-Damar yesterday. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4102, 21 Apr 82 pp 11, 12]

SUDAN-KENYA HIGHWAY--Khartoum, April 28, (SUNA)--Work on Juba-Torit-Ludwara highway project will begin next week after all preparations are completed, SUNA learnt. The road construction contract which was signed on the 15th last February stipulated that work should start within 75 days. It is understood that the 582-kilometre-highway will link Kenya with Sudan. USAID has provided \$10 million for financing the road while the EEC has contributed \$11 million of the total cost which amounts to \$31 million. The rest of the money will be provided by the Sudanese and Kenyan governments. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4109, 28 Apr 82 p 2]

NILE WATERS COMMISSION REPORT--Khartoum, April 23, (SUNA)--The Chairman of the Egyptian side in the Joint Technical Commission of the Nile Waters Eng. Muhammad Amin Muhammadayn and Commission Member Eng. Kamal 'Ali returned here Wednesday after representing the Commission in the meetings of the Nile States of the Equatorial Lakes project which was held in Kampala, Uganda on April 19-22. The meeting discussed steps so far taken towards the gathering and analysis of hydrological and metrological data for the tropical zone in a way that it could serve the future water policies of the Nile States. The project which is scheduled to be extended for 2 years will serve certain objectives for further cooperation in the domain of proper water utilization. It has been agreed that another meeting be convened next August in Cairo for further discussion on the project's future. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4104, 23 Apr 82 p 4]

CRUDE OIL PRICE AGREEMENT--Khartoum, April 23, (SUNA)--The first agreement on investment of Sudanese crude petroleum was initially signed here yesterday. Energy and Mining Minister Dr Sharif al-Juhami and Mr Al Martini, the director of the Chevron Overseas Company (Standard Oil of California) initially signed here an agreement on prices of Sudanese crude oil delivered at the Unity and Al-Talih oilfields which will feed the Kosti refinery to operate at a daily output of 25,000 barrels. Besides being the first agreement of its kind that specifies the price per barrel of Sudanese produced petroleum the agreement also signals the start of the process of the investment of Sudanese oil and further contributes to the financing of the Kosti refinery which contracts for its establishment are expected to be completed by the end of this year, Energy and Mining ministry sources said. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4104, 23 Apr 82 p 2]

CSO: 4500/169

TUNISIA

GOVERNMENT POLICIES QUESTIONED

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 23 Apr 82 pp 5-6

[Article: "Open Government After 2 Years"]

[Text] The riots in Qafsah flared up on 27 January 1970 and then Hedi Nouira was afflicted by a disease which disabled him and Mohamed Mzali was assigned to the premiership on this day 2 years ago.

Mohamed Mzali's assumption of the premiership aroused hope because the citizens liked what he said and felt in him a special sensitivity to many of their problems. The initial decisions came to support the citizens' optimism and we on our part did not hesitate to declare our backing and supported the positive actions taken by the new government both in the political sphere and the social sphere, noting at the same time that the government should not delay in embarking on the fundamental changes expected by the masses in the various constitutional institutions, on reconsidering the fundamental options and on reviewing the methods of government themselves.

But hardly a few months had passed when conditions returned to what they had been previously, even to worse than what they had been.

On occasion of the formation of Mzali's government, we proposed broad lines for a 20-point program. The esteemed reader may not judge if the government has succeeded in its policy or if it has disappointed the hopes.

Public Liberties

Respecting the country's constitution by embodying the basic liberties stipulated in chapter eight of the constitution, especially by:

- A. Giving the political currents wishing to form a political party the legal permit to do so.
- B. Giving anyone wishing to issue a newspaper the legal permit to do so.
- C. Respecting the freedom of gathering.
- D. Respecting the unionist liberties.

Positive:

The freedom of engaging in unionist activity, recognition of the Tunisian Communist Party and the emergence of a number of new papers.

Negative:

Refusing to license the other political movements and the Consumer Protection Association.

Repressing the Islamic-oriented movement and confiscating the free newspapers.

Separation of Powers

Respecting the country's constitution by enacting the separation of powers stipulated in the prologue to the constitution to guarantee the independence of the judiciary in particular.

Positive:

The omission of chapter 109 from the country's constitution.

Negative:

Dissolving the National Assembly.

The executive authority's interference with the judiciary in numerous cases. We mention in particular the circumstances under which the Islamic current was tried and the review concerning (civil status regulations).

On Identity

Bolstering the country's Arab and Islamic identity by respecting the Tunisian people's mainstays and sanctities, respecting the constitution's assertion that Tunisia is a Muslim Arab state, working to develop the country in a sound manner in which material progress is not realized at the expense of the spiritual values and exerting positive efforts to see that the spirit of openness, tolerance and solidarity prevails in relations among people.

Bolstering the country's Arab Islamic identity requires a profound reform of the education plan and of the cultural policy.

Negative:

Continued duality.

Nothing new in the educational and cultural policy.

Constitutional Council

Setting up a constitutional council to watch the compatibility of the laws with the constitution.

Negative: Nothing has been done.

Vacancy

Introducing a constitutional amendment to separate the premiership [from other positions] and to fill vacancy of the presidency by way of election within a reasonable time after the vacancy occurs.

Negative: Nothing has changed.

State and Party

Separating the Destourian Socialist Party from the state, keeping the administration free of political influences and interference and putting an end to the use of the administrative agencies and of the state resources for the service of the ruling party.

Negative: The situation is the same and the legislative elections have come to confirm the danger of mingling the state and the administration with the Destourian Party.

Independence of Organizations

Devoting attention to the independence of all the national organizations and not allowing the ruling party to interfere in their affairs, a matter which requires in particular enabling the workers and the students to hold free democratic conferences.

Positive:

The Tunisian General Federation of Labor [UGTT] has gained its freedom.

Negative:

The other organizations have maintained their condition as cells receiving orders from the Destourian Party.

Individual Safety

Protecting the citizens' safety by making the security authorities the only authorities responsible for the citizens' safety and security, by punishing whoever resorts to torture and by reviewing the precautionary detention system.

Negative:

'Strong-arm' groups have intervened on numerous occasions without the security agencies batting an eyelid.

After being detained, elements of the partisan militia were released even though the charges against them were proven. The precautionary detention system is still the same.

Amnesty

Declaring a general legislative amnesty that enables the political and unionist prisoners to regain their freedom and rights and enables those who emigrated from the country for political reasons to return to their homeland.

Negative:

Even though the declaration of a general legislative amnesty will crown the measures taken so far in the interest of numerous unionist and political prisoners, the government is still not ready to respond to this popular demand.

Economy

Reviewing the economic and social policy on the basis of:

- A. Giving priority to meeting the country's needs and to enhancing the purchasing ability of the middle and poor classes.
- B. Realizing justice between the classes and the provinces and balance between the sectors.
- C. Exerting efforts to curtail the economic subservience.

Positive:

A number of decisions seeking to reduce the imbalance between the provinces.

Negative:

Continuation of the liberal economic policy enacted in the 1970's and rejection of the essential structural reforms without which everything will remain brittle and the country's subservience will worsen.

Information

Reviewing the information policy by respecting the freedom of the press and by turning the official information into an objective and unbiased information that respects the citizens' feelings and treats them as mature people.

Netative:

The situation is the same.

The official information continues to treat the citizen as ignorant. The government's actions toward the press have continued to be oppressive and offhanded actions.

Drafting a bill to reform the press law has continued to be ink on paper.

Youth

Reviewing the youth policy on a basis that gives youth faith in sublime values and ideals, nurture true patriotism in them and channel their creative capabilities to enhance themselves and to sacrifice for society.

Negative:

Nothing new.

Delinquency and violence are rising constantly.

Education

Restoring the original role of the educational institution as a center of scientific and educational development and not as a den of partisan propaganda. This requires reviewing the criteria on whose basis principals are assigned, abolishing the partisan activities and frameworks intruding on the school, approving a progressive and rational concept for Tunisizing and Arabizing the curricula, enabling the students to form a federation that unites their ranks in a manner similar to the Student Organization and allowing the educators to actually participate, through their representative organizations, in determining whatever pertains to the profession.

Negative:

Nothing new.

The actions are still the same and are based on offhandedness and the breach of promises at the level of the educational policy and in the relations with the teachers and the students.

Culture

Dealing with the conditions of the cultural institutions in a manner that opens the door of publication, information and action for the idle national capabilities in all the spheres of art, literature and thought and that puts an end to the invasion of our markets by the poor and degenerated foreign production.

Negative: Both in theory and in actions.

Flagrant intervention to fight the efforts seeking to establish a free culture.

Provinces

Reviewing the provincial system by turning the provincial councils into elected and responsible councils and supplying them with the resources to realize fair and integrated provincial development.

Negative:

Nothing noteworthy. The provincial councils have continued to be administrative instruments lacking representation and influence.

Municipalities

Reforming the municipal system in a fundamental manner by reviewing the relationship between the municipality and the supervising authority and the relationship between the municipality and the citizens and by giving the municipalities the powers and the resources capable of turning them into democratic, responsible and effective beehives performing their tasks in the best manner possible.

Negative:

Nothing noteworthy. The municipalities are partisan cells. The deterioration noticed in most of them indicates that the times have passed them.

Foreign Policy

Adopting a foreign policy that abides by nonalignment in the conflict between the two camps, that supports the liberation causes and that works to create relations of cooperation and respect between the Arab countries generally and in the greater Maghreb in particular in preparation for the unity of these countries.

Negative:

Further subservience to the Western camp and conflicting positions that indicate lack of harmony and of stability.

Favoritism

Exerting efforts to fight favoritism and provincial tendencies by making sure that the administration and the public establishments serve all and treat all the citizens equally, without any consideration for personal, partisan or provincial affiliations.

Negative:

The situation is the same. Rather, it has deteriorated.

Management

Fighting mismanagement, the squandering of public monies and graft and subjecting tamperers to stiff penalties.

Negative:

Nothing noteworthy. The situation has even deteriorated.

Elections

Reviewing the election (regulations) on a basis that guarantees the holding of elections in a free and democratic manner and without any intervention by the administration or the official media and holding general elections to make the National Assembly more representative of the Tunisian people.

Negative:

The situation is the same. Rather, what happened on 1 November is truly considered a crime against the people.

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CSO: 4504/281

END